

Editorial

APPRENTICESHIP INITIATION AND AFTER

Three years ago the newly appointed editorial team set out guidelines to be followed by both authors and the editors themselves. For the former these included an emphasis on the contemporary relevance of their subject and a clarity of language in addressing a multi-disciplinary audience. For the editors our manifesto included a return to the cross-disciplinary scope of early volumes of *Human Relations* while retaining an emphasis on theoretical imagination and originality in treatment of the subject. More prosaically we set ourselves the task of improving and tightening operating procedures so that both authors and reviewers received quicker acknowledgement of their contributions.

Over this period we regretfully lost the guidance of the Consulting Editor Michael Foster. But we believe progress has been made toward the targets that he and the Editorial Team set themselves. We gained immensely from increased dialogue with readers, reviewers, and potential authors. This has been carried on through a number of channels, including face-to-face contacts at our special events, a growth in written correspondence with potential authors, and, of course, an increasing number of manuscripts received. Not all the comments we have received have been uncritical: we have especially benefited from exchanges with an active and committed external editorial panel as well as the regular comments from our reviewers. Many people have travelled considerable distances to meet and discuss with us the future of the journal.

SPECIFIC DIRECTIONS

We now feel able to reaffirm a number of directions set at the start of our apprenticeship as editors and give a clearer sense of direction. With this in mind the mission statement contained on the flyleaf was redrafted to emphasize the coupling of academic rigor with contemporary relevance

with which this journal gained its present international reputation. More substantively the content of *Human Relations* will show an increased emphasis on analysis that recognizes the dynamic nature of perception and the perceived.

It is our intention to publish from a range of interpretive perspectives on social action while continuing to select from more traditional comparative static approaches to field analysis those studies that demonstrate genuinely original extensions of existing theory or policy analysis. We are especially anxious to demonstrate new perspectives on the nature of subjectivity and social change, particularly as these involve the cognitive construction of life and career trajectories. We are committed to an eclecticism in approach and methodology but will always favor that which gives emphasis to *the dynamic nature of personal and collective learning*. Comparative and longitudinal case histories are to be regarded as valid vehicles for such analyses within the constraints of article-length manuscripts.

RIGOR AND MEANING

While encouraging originality in argument we *are* concerned to retain a logical rigor in the development of ideas and evidence. This starts with a willingness on the part of the author to explain the significance of the ideas to be expressed in his or her paper in a way that will convince colleagues outside the specialized field in which the research or work of scholarship has been undertaken. In practice this means conveying to the editors and, hopefully, to readers a sense of the excitement felt by the author(s) towards the *ideas* to be presented in the paper and an importance in their meaning that goes beyond replication of other specialized work. It also means marshalling evidence to test an argument or thesis that is in some way remarkable or counter-intuitive, and doing so in a manner that enables a non-specialist audience to judge its credibility.

Without such conviction it seems unlikely that a reader from another field will be motivated to investigate an exhaustive list of specialist citations. Given the fragmented and specialized nature of contemporary social science it is generally impossible that one author will be able to conduct an exhaustive search of prior citations. This makes it all the more important that the significance of each citation should be meaningfully explained in terms of the argument being presented by the citer. It is more important in a cross-disciplinary journal that the reader should understand the significance of the contribution made by *each* cited scholar than be presented with a line of text made up of unknown and unexplained surnames and a subsequent wedge of citations. The writer should not

assume that manipulating the “rules of the game” that apply when convincing investigators in his or her own specialized field (or an examiner of a doctoral thesis) will extend to convincing other members of the scholarly community.

For similar reasons we will continue to regard the discussion of findings as requiring something other than an observation of the inconclusive nature of statistical results and suggestions for future research based on the inclusion of yet further synthetic induction. Where statistical analysis is used we should even welcome discussion of the assumptions upon which particular scaled items were constructed and why that process is being validated in the present case. Imaginative suggestions for further extension of the ideas underlying the research are, however, as likely to interest the broad church that makes up the *Human Relations* audience.

FEATURES IN OUR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT

The journal came into being during a period of rapid social change after World War II. It was, however, a period of relatively evolutionary change within the apparently limitless bounds of Keynesian economic growth. The focus of the journal then was on the dynamic patterning of social exchanges taking place within relatively easily identifiable institutional and ideational systems in which conflict was regarded as containable. Though often described as “turbulent,” such systems conveyed a degree of relative stability. Today the continuity of those systems is being visibly challenged by circumstance rather than conscious revolt in a way that must hold implications for existing methodologies based in unlinear comparative static modes of investigation and analysis. We see the role of the journal as having been extended by such circumstances to that of a challenging re-examination of many of the precepts of social science that have been inherited from that time of relative stability or growth.

Over the next three years we intend to inaugurate a number of special features designed to signpost areas of questioning and reformulation in scientific approaches to social problems. One vehicle for this inquiry will be a series of special issues commencing in February 1993 with a collection of articles drawn together by Max Elden and Rupert Chisholm on “Action Research.” Each of these issues will be followed by a critique by equally distinguished scholars in subsequent issues. The second in this series in Summer 1993 will be devoted to the converging points of analysis contained within “Socio-Economics.” In addition to these special issues we are commissioning a number of review articles focussed on major books or other contributions to the literature of the social sciences. These will span a range of conceptual dimensions, from that of the relationship of social

change to the development of personal subjectivity to that of collective or organizational learning.

CONTINUING THE DIALOGUE

We move into the next three years of our artisanal development with considerable hope and anticipation of the achievement of our goals. We do so in the company of our distinguished board of editorial advisors and in continued dialogue with our readers and contributors. We hope that you will continue to respond to the changes in the journal with the same constructive criticism that many have offered over the first three years of our apprenticeship.

Understanding the Leader–Strategy Interface: Application of the Strategic Relationship Interview Method

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The argument that leaders substantially affect organizational outcome is presented. In order to better understand the leader/strategy/environment interface, however, the question of *what* leaders do has to be supplemented with *why* they are doing it. It is argued that the assessment of a leader's preoccupations will make for more effective human resource planning by facilitating the match between leader and organization. Unfortunately, the accurate assessment of a leader's preoccupations is still in its infancy. To fill the gap, this paper proposes a research methodology based on the clinical concept of transference, i.e., repetitive, consistent patterns of interaction which are unique to each individual. The applicability of the Strategic Relationship Interview Method (a derivative of the Core Conflictual Relationship Theme Method as developed by Luborsky and his collaborators) is explored as potentially a relatively simple way to capture the essence of leadership. Using the Strategic Relationship Interview Method (SRIM), one systematically identifies the central relationship patterns of key executives by analyzing and scoring specific narratives. In order to illustrate its application, an example is given of the SRIM using as "text" the statements made by an entrepreneur.

KEY WORDS: leadership; transference; organizational outcome; personality.

THE LEADER: MARIONETTE OR GREAT MAN?

A great deal of controversy exists in management literature about whether leaders really make a difference in the running of organizations

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(Lieberson & O'Connor, 1972). Population ecologists (Hannah & Freeman, 1977), resource dependency theorists (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), or attribution theory advocates (Calder, 1977; Lord & Smith, 1983; Meindl, Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 1985) argue that factors other than leadership affect organizational performance. According to these researchers, leadership explains very little of the variance in performance. Obviously, if this point of view is taken to the extreme, leaders turn into marionettes led by forces over which they have very little or no control.

In direct opposition to this point of view we find the "great man" orientation to leadership (Bass, 1981). Proponents of this research outlook (which has gone through various transformations over time) argue that, because of certain unique personality characteristics leaders greatly affect the levers of change and transformation (MacGregor Burns, 1978; Tichy & Devanna, 1986); according to them, leaders are the ones who make things happen. Unfortunately, this point of view may be somewhat one-sided. In this case, insufficient attention is paid to the role of the followers and of situational forces.

Most likely, the "truth" lies somewhere in between. As Gupta (1984) very appropriately argues, ". . . the discretion available to a GM (general manager) should be expected to vary across organizational contexts and across performance criteria" (p. 400). Leaders' characteristics, followers, and situational forces all affect organizational performance. Obviously, a complex process of interaction exists between leader, organization, and environment.

Drawing from studies of the top executive-organization interface, Miller and Toulouse (1986) support this point of view. For example, they recognize the contingent nature of the process when they conclude that the relationship between the leader's personality and the environmental context will be especially strong in smaller companies and dynamic, unpredictable, and changing environments.

What complicates the leadership question even further, is that in the leader-strategy interface, bounded rationality becomes the rule (March & Simon, 1956). It has become increasingly clear that a leader's ability to handle complex decisions is subject to certain cognitive limitations.

Realizing the importance of environmental forces as well as the human limitations present in rational choice has led to increasing evidence showing that leaders do substantially affect organizational outcome (Miller, Kets de Vries, & Toulouse, 1982; Gupta & Govindarajan, 1984; Miller & Toulouse, 1986; Beatty & Zajac, 1987). This strategic choice orientation to leadership (Andrews, 1980; Child, 1972; Bowman, 1986), somehow replaces the great man outlook and negates the claims of the population ecologists, the resource dependency theorists, or the extreme attribution theory advocates. It is also defended by practitioners (*Business Week*, 1980). The

strategic choice orientation argues that strategies very much reflect the idiosyncrasies of the decision makers. According to Hambrick (1989):

Biases, blinders, egos, aptitudes, experiences, fatigue, and other human factors in the executive ranks greatly affect what happens to companies As a result, if we want to explain why organizations do the things they do, or, in turn, why they perform the way they do, we must examine the people at the top (p. 5).

Although there is increasing consensus for Hambrick's conclusion, the specifics are very much in question. Exactly what are the relationships between the top managers and their strategies, which dimension would be used to characterize both, what is the direction of causality at work, and under what conditions are the relationships strongest?

Some efforts to look at these interrelationships have occurred. Consequently, a considerable number of conceptual models matching leaders to strategies have come to the fore (Wissema, Van der Pol, & Messer, 1980; Kets de Vries & Miller, 1984, 1986; Szilagyi & Schweiger, 1984; Gupta, 1984; Herbert & Deresky, 1987, 1987; Smith, Mitchell, & Summer, 1985).

LIMITATIONS OF PREVIOUS STUDIES

Although we welcome the increased recognition of the importance of the leader in strategy making, the existing research studies have their limitations. To take a few examples: researchers such as Guth and Tagiuri (1965) have suggested some very abstract managerial types with the implication that they might influence strategy. They did not, however, tell us which type of strategies were related to their different kind of leaders. In the Wissema et al. study (1980), behavioral characteristics such as conformity, sociability, activity, pressure to achieve, and style of thinking are selected. According to the authors, these characteristics—in different configurations—make up six strategic archetypes which are matched with six strategies. How the authors arrive at these behavioral characteristics is, however, never made clear. Moreover, we can go one step further and question whether these characteristics really reflect the essence of an individual's personality. Leontiades (1982) proposed eight types of managers and related them to the nature of diversification. In his model, a distinction is made between a steady state and an evolutionary philosophy of management, each consisting of four prototypes. Unfortunately, Leontiades does not really develop the relationship between these prototypes and the various strategy-type activities. Hambrick and Masson (1984) have limited themselves to the potential role of leader demographic characteristics in shaping the organization. Herbert and Deresky (1987) propose four distinct generic strategies and make conjectures about the kind of

personality factors necessary to implement each one. Interesting as this study may be, the linkage between the various strategies and the personality dimensions remains tenuous. The authors do not really describe the logic behind the selection of certain skills and personality orientations.

Indeed, there have been a host of conceptual pieces relating individual leadership dimensions to those of strategy, but much fewer empirical studies. A number of researchers (Miller et al., 1982; Gupta & Govindarajan, 1984; Miller & Toulouse, 1986), however, have made an empirical attempt to link personality with strategy. Personality dimensions such as locus of control, need for achievement, flexibility, tolerance for ambiguity, and willingness to take risks were selected and related to strategy and structure. From a conceptual point of view these studies are a step in the right direction. The emphasis in field research has been on unidimensional aspects of personality rather than core themes. One can question whether the use of a few standard personality dimensions suffices to grasp the complexity and richness of character and a CEO's preoccupations (Kets de Vries & Perzow, 1991). Furthermore, one can have reservations about the reliability and validity of data based on self-reports.

Another contribution to a better understanding of the link between leader, organization, and environment has been made through ethnographic, observational studies (Carlson, 1951; Stewart, 1967; Mintzberg, 1973; Kotter, 1982.) Although this body of literature has opened our eyes to the richness and complexity of the leader-strategy interface, it may be argued that these studies have not gone far enough. In carefully monitoring various managerial roles they have remained at a purely descriptive level. The reason why leaders do certain things has been left largely unanswered.

A more ethnographic approach to the study of strategic decision making has been the analysis of the shared language of top managers (Sapienza, 1987). Although one can praise Sapienza's efforts in trying to find relationships between top management's imagery and its strategy, one can lament the lack of clinically-based conceptual models, themes, concepts, and interpretations, leading not surprisingly (in spite of 7 months' effort) to relatively trivial findings. Unfortunately, Sapienza does not explore the reasons why certain executives come up with specific images.

Valuable as all these studies may be, they do not answer the question of why leaders take certain action. If we want to reach a better understanding of the match between leader and organization we must now go beyond responding to what leaders do and explore *why* they are doing it.

INTEGRATING DESCRIPTIVE AND ANALYTIC APPROACHES

Kets de Vries and Miller (1984, 1986) have taken a more analytical clinical orientation and generated a set of complex hypotheses about relationships between different leadership styles, each style's predominant motivating fantasy, the emerging organizational culture, and the strategy and structure of the overall organization. In their conceptualizations, "fantasies" refer to complex and stable psychological structures that underlie observable behavior (Kets de Vries & Miller, 1984). These hypotheses have been tested by Noël (1984, 1989), who observed and interviewed a number of CEOs over an extended period of time. His study is a first systematic attempt to supplement the question of what leaders do with the "why" they are doing it. Noël concludes that each CEO enacts (Weick, 1970) a very idiosyncratic product which he calls the strategic core. The core is a set of activities and communication patterns that a CEO sets in motion; it is central to the existence of the organization, its mission, and purpose. His work highlights the way in which issues or persons gain importance in organizations because of some kind of match with the underlying preoccupations of the CEO. Noël argues that each CEO is possessed of a "magnificent obsession," a certain *Weltanschauung* which is relatively rigid and which explains why certain activities are central to the strategic core. He demonstrates that these magnificent obsessions play a central role in strategy making.

Although Noël's work is a commendable attempt to integrate the descriptive with the analytical and is much richer than the previously cited studies, his research methodology poses problems. The main one is that his study is very difficult to replicate, primarily because of its extremely time-consuming nature. Obviously, it is very hard to find executives willing to collaborate in research of this kind. Thus, for reasons of practicality, other methodologies have to be found to understand a leader's main preoccupations and the linkages to strategy making without sacrificing richness of content. It is the objective of this paper to propose a research methodology that is relatively simple and reliable but captures the essence of leadership in order to better grasp the role of the leader in a strategy-making context. Understanding a leader's preoccupations will make for more effective manpower planning by facilitating the match between the leader and the organization.

THE CENTRALITY OF TRANSFERENCE IN LEADERSHIP RESEARCH

The "royal road" to the understanding of a CEO's preoccupations, to paraphrase Freud—the diagnosis of his or her style—goes through

the transference. Transference is a term known foremost in the clinical setting. It refers to the interface between therapist and patient and can be described as a confusion in time and place. Transference patterns have an early origin and derive from the kind of relationships which develop between parents and children. It can be described as the projection or displacement upon another person of unconscious wishes and feelings originally directed toward important individuals in childhood (Greenson, 1967; Langs, 1976; Kets de Vries & Miller, 1984). Transference is the determining factor in understanding an individual's style. In the therapeutic setting, transference reactions offer the therapist an opportunity to observe in the here and now the patterns of interaction which are unique to the patient. In response to Freud's question about the importance of transference Jung is said to have replied, "It is the alpha and omega of treatment," to which Freud responded, "You have understood" (Storr, 1979).

As early as 1912, Freud argued that each individual possesses ". . . what might be described as a stereotype plate (or several such), which is constantly repeated — constantly reprinted afresh — in the course of a person's life" (pp. 99-100). In studying individual patients he was struck by the consistency of this pattern over time. Freud's insight led the way to understanding that the accurate assessment of transference patterns in psychotherapy is the key to successful intervention and change. The identification of transference patterns becomes the shortcut to an individual's major preoccupations and will facilitate comprehension of behavior and actions.

From quite a different perspective, the political scientist Nathan Leites (1951) introduced the concept of the "operational code," meaning those rules of conduct and norms of behavior that are relatively stable. To some extent one can look at his operational code as a derivative of transference patterns. It ". . . can serve as a useful 'bridge' or 'link' to psychodynamic interpretations of unconscious dimensions of belief systems and their role in behavior under different conditions" (George, 1969, p. 195). Leites even went so far as to apply his operational code not only to individuals but also to nations at large.

The notion of "stereotype plates" was also recognized by the pioneer in the development of the analysis of symbolic statements, Murray (1938), who, from his studies of human lives, concluded:

Experience was to teach us that, though the reasons for many of the subject's responses were mysterious and much of his past entirely out of reach, it was possible to find in most individuals an underlying reaction system, termed by us *unity-thema*, which was the key to his unique nature. I say "key" because if one assumed the activity of this unity-thema many superficially unintelligible actions and expressions became, as it were, psychologically inevitable. A *unity-thema* is a compound of interrelated — collaborating or conflicting — dominant needs that are linked to

pressures to which the individual was exposed on one or more particular occasions, gratifying or traumatic, in early childhood . . .

As soon as we realized the force of the unity theme its importance . . . began to dawn upon us. For if every response is the objectification of an aspect of a particular personality and the most fundamental and characteristic determinant of a personality is a unity-theme, then many responses cannot be fully understood except in terms of their relationship to the unity-theme . . . (pp. 604-605).

Murray tried to operationalize the identification of these unity themes through his Thematic Apperception Test—analyzing narratives in response to fictional scenes depicted on cards. A more recent and very promising approach to teasing out a person’s main preoccupations (influenced by Murray’s work) has been developed by Luborsky and his associates (Luborsky, 1984; Luborsky & Crits-Christoph, 1985; Luborsky et al., 1985; Luborsky, Crits-Christoph, & Mellon, 1986; Luborsky, Crits-Christoph, Minz, & Auerbach, 1988). Luborsky introduced a system for assessing central relationship patterns by analyzing narratives and looking at consistencies across narratives. The primary data used in what he calls the Core Conflictual Relationship Theme Method (CCRT) is short episodes related in psychotherapy sessions. In contrast to the Thematic Apperception Test where fictional stories are used, Luborsky’s approach may be more appropriate since real, personal episodes are dealt with: the researcher is, consequently, closer to the primary data. In applying their system Luborsky and his co-workers discovered that the focus on specific narratives (with the obvious advantage of being less time consuming) did not entail a significant loss of information.

In order to operationalize a system of scoring, transcripts of these narrative episodes are given to a number of independent judges who are asked to identify three components within each episode: the person’s main wishes, needs, or intentions vis-à-vis the other person in the narrative (W), the responses of the other person (RO), and the responses of the self (RS) (Luborsky et al., 1986). In summarizing their system, Luborsky and his collaborators argue that “. . . the steps in the CCRT method represent a formalization of the usual inference process of clinicians in formulating transference patterns” (Luborsky & Crits-Christoph, 1985, p. 13). One may add that studies of CCRT application have shown remarkable agreement in CCRT scoring among the judges.

The Luborsky method has been used in clinical settings and there has been excellent correspondence between the transference relationships that emerged in long-term therapy between patients and their therapist, and the relationships between these patients and other people that emerged in the CCRT interviews (Luborsky et al., 1986, 1988). The same critical themes emerged in both settings, attesting to the validity of the

instrument. Also, there was excellent inter-rater reliability among the coders of clinical sessions ($r = .88$) (Levine & Luborsky, 1981). The patients' primary wishes were manifested in 80% of their CCRT relationship episodes, secondary wishes were manifested only 16% of the time. Finally, the CCRT wishes were very stable over a 1-year period, indicating that core aspects of personality were indeed being tapped (Luborsky & Crits-Cristoph, 1985).

We see the CCRT method as a supplement to structured interviewing, not as a replacement for it. But CCRT has some very real advantages. First, it reliably elicits the core relational themes that are so fundamental to personality, and have so many implications for behavior. Second, it also reliably systematizes this information by bringing to bear a number of independent coders and rigorous scoring protocols. Third, while it may be more difficult to get cooperation from subjects for the CCRT than for a simple questionnaire, the method goes much deeper to uncover core wishes. Moreover, it does not involve as much embarrassing probing as structured interviews, whose reliability is often suspect.

Given the advantages of this approach to understanding behavior, Luborsky and his associates wanted to make the method available to a wider audience for research purposes. They wished to go beyond a purely psychotherapeutic setting and develop "... a new method that would elicit relationship anecdotes in the course of any interview situation, not just in psychotherapy" (1985, p. 4). They therefore developed what they called the Relationship Anecdote Paradigm Method (RAP). According to them, the CCRT and RAP approaches provide comparable results. Given this widening scope, an obvious application of the RAP approach is the study of leadership and strategy, where it presents an opportunity to develop a much better understanding of strategy-leadership content issues.

THE EFFECT OF CORE PERSONALITY THEMES ON STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE

It might be useful to suggest some specific relationships between leader personality themes and the strategies and structures of their organization. Luborsky et al. (1986) have suggested that although the details of transferential themes are unique, some very common themes surface with great regularity: the core wishes that may typically emerge among executives are such themes as the desire to assert one's independence and autonomy, to dominate others, to be in control, to be close to and open to others, to be noticed, respected, recognized, or seen as special, to achieve and be successful, to be helped and cared for by others, to get back at or to hurt others, and to give in, submit, and be passive.

Some of these themes may relate to aspects of strategy, structure, and decision making as follows. Those who express a wish for *control* are expected to require greater certainty in their firm's operations. They will therefore collect and process more information before making decisions, eschew risk taking, make use of control devices such as budgets, plans, and cost centers, and be reluctant to branch into unfamiliar areas. They are unlikely to want to do much innovation, as this is rather risky and uncertain. These tendencies are rather consistent with Porter's (1980) focused cost leadership strategy and the defender strategy of Miles and Snow (1978).

On the other hand, executives who express a wish to *dominate* are likely to try to exercise control over other firms in their industries; they may vie actively for market share using aggressive advertising and distribution strategies, and they may try to range broadly in their industries, diversifying into promising areas of the market. They will also tend to centralize authority and to move boldly. These tendencies are consistent with Miller's (1986) marketing differentiation strategy, a variant of Porter's (1980) differentiation strategy.

The wish to *be open to others* may induce managers to set up highly consultative structures in which close collaboration and teamwork are encouraged and bureaucracy is avoided. Such structures are particularly useful to implement strategies of innovation (Burns & Stalker, 1961). These include the prospector strategies of Miles and Snow (1978), and the innovative differentiation strategy of Miller (1986)—again a variant of Porter's (1980) differentiation strategy.

Finally, the wish to *be seen as special, as being recognized* may also translate into a diversification strategy—one that draws attention to a firm and its leader in the marketplace. These tentative hypotheses are summarized in Table I. It seems then, that personality themes may give rise to organizational *configurations* (Miller & Friesen, 1984), the latter representing constellations of interdependent elements of strategy, structure, culture, and decision-making style.

We do not expect the relationships of Table I to hold with equal strength in all settings. There are a number of conditioning factors that are likely to come into play. For example, the relationships are much more likely to hold where leaders have much power in their organizations; where they have much opportunity and occasion to change strategies; and where firms are small enough for the CEO's personal influence to be strong.

Note also that the relationship between a CEO's personality and the strategy of his firm may be bi-directional, with executives shaping their strategies, and firms selecting for CEO's those whose personalities match

Table I. Personality Theme, Structure, and Strategy

Core wish	Strategy and structure
1. To be in control	Modest risk taking Desire for much information Cost control, budgets, planning Focused cost leadership Defender strategy
2. To be domineering	Broad score (low focus) Takeovers Risk taking Marketing differentiation
3. To be open to others	Collaborative structures Participative decision making Prospector strategy
4. To be organized	Diversification Acquisitions

existing strategies. However, personalities tend to be rather enduring, and to the extent that CEOs have much power in their organizations, their personalities will help shape strategy rather than the other way around.

THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP INTERVIEW METHOD

We view the strategic relationship interview method (SRIM) as a potentially useful system (really an outgrowth of the CCRT) to help the researcher uncover a leader's main preoccupations and strategic orientation. In order to facilitate the gathering of material about strategic orientation, specific instructions are given by the interviewer (see Appendix). In short, the leader is encouraged to tell three or four narratives relating to each of three categories: (1) parents, spouse, lover, children, friends, or other important people in their private sphere, (2) subordinates, and (3) other stakeholders such as board members, bankers, customers, suppliers, competitors, union members, or government officials.

For the purposes of assessment, diversity in the narratives is important. Also, the period of the narrator's life during which these episodes take place should vary. He or she should be encouraged to recount incidents from both present and past in order to allow the researcher to arrive at a complete assessment of his or her preoccupations. In addition, in order to facilitate the rating process, it is desirable for the incidents to be rather

specific. The task of the assessors is to identify the themes that repeat themselves by rating wishes, needs, or intentions, responses from others, and responses from self. The frequency with which certain themes occur will signal certain preoccupations and give insight into strategic orientation.

Example of the SRIM

An example of the application of the SRIM follows. For the purposes of demonstration the narratives have been condensed. The subject of investigation is a very visible European entrepreneur who is running an extremely successful enterprise. Three narratives are presented. In the first narrative, the entrepreneur talks about a Mr. X, a former business associate. The second narrative concerns the entrepreneur's mother, and the third has to do with his dealings with Mr. Y, his new managing director (he himself holds the position of chairman).

In the first episode, we can see how the entrepreneur receives an unusual business proposal which gets him quite excited but also makes him anxious. It is clear that it offers an excellent opportunity to pursue his desire for recognition. However, quite a few people he deals with appear to be critical of this unconventional venture and, in his opinion, become unhelpful and interfering. Their intrusion makes us alert to his main wish to assert his independence and autonomy, which is also central to episodes two and three (Table II).

Ten similar episodes were collected from our entrepreneur. After studying the narratives, three assessors were asked to specify the wishes, the responses from others, and the responses from self in each episode — as we did in our example. The frequency with which each assessor noted a given sentiment was subsequently summarized in a table in which responses from the self and from others are also classified in “negative” and “positive” categories. The frequency tallies as reflected in Table III highlight the entrepreneur's main preoccupations.

The scores underline what was already obvious in our analysis of the first three episodes: the main preoccupation of this person is to assert his independence and autonomy. A secondary preoccupation centers around the wish to be recognized. It appears that other people are considered to be dominating and sometimes as critical or unhelpful. However, others are not just seen as being negative. There are quite a few people who are perceived as supportive, respectful, helpful, and concerned, factors which must be a great source of strength and confidence to this individual. But despite these positive impressions one thing is clear from the frequency distribution and that is that this person experiences a strong fear of control. Feelings of obligation and frustration also play a role in his personality make-up as

Table II. Example of Condensed Narratives and Typical Scores

Relationship episodes	Inferences about W, RO, and RS
Object: Mr. X (a former associate)	
"I received a friendly telephone call from X who had a wonderful idea for an unusual business venture"	RO: Treats me respectfully RS: Feeling happy, excited
"I got interested since I had a real chance to succeed in something quite exciting"	RS: Feeling self-confident
"My associates thought I was foolhardy and a megalomaniac to get into this venture"	RO: Critical, disapproving
"I had sleepless nights because of lack of time to get the venture off the ground"	RS: Feeling anxious
"I had to get personally involved in a major public relations campaign to publicize the venture"	RS: Being assertive W: To be recognized
"I had to get rid of X, he wasn't delivering"	RS: Being assertive RO: Being unhelpful, uncooperative
"X tried to block the appointment of my people on the board; he wants to put me in a corner"	RO: Interfering W: To assert my independence and autonomy
Object: mother	
"My mother is trying to get me involved in one mad idea after another"	RO: Interfering
"She would say, 'When are you going to do something useful with your life.' She then told me to invest in this wacky project in France. I let it be, after all, she is my mother, but I must admit that I was quite annoyed"	RO: Critical RO: Domineering RS: Being frustrated W: To assert myself
"I would sometimes like to put her in her place"	W: To assert myself
"She would say that nothing is impossible, the only person making it happen is yourself"	RO: Being concerned W: To assert myself
"She also told her friends that one day I would be Prime Minister"	RO: Being supportive

(Continued)

Table II. Example of Condensed Narratives and Typical Scores

Relationship episodes	Inferences about W, RO, and RS
Object: Mr. Y (new managing director) "My 'cottage industry' days were over. I had to get more financial expertise"	RS: Feeling less confident
"The first thing he told me was that I needed more capital to get the American operation up and running"	RO: Dominating
"Y helped me in my negotiations with banks to arrange flotation on the stock exchange"	RO: Being supportive
"I told him I didn't want any non-executive director on the board"	RS: Fear of control W: To assert my independence and autonomy
"Y can be rather nitpicky telling me that I shouldn't do certain things"	RO: Dominating

demonstrated in his leadership behavior. He responds to these sentiments mainly with assertiveness. Finally, we can note how his feelings of self-confidence oscillate. Although as a rule he exudes self-confidence, happiness, and a sense of community with others, at times, in spite of his cockiness, he is less confident and anxious.

This individual's personality make-up and major preoccupations explain his venturesome behavior. Our executive has a great need to assert himself and seeks recognition through bold moves in the business realm. He is a risk taker (but within bounds) and follows an aggressive acquisition and diversification strategy. His personal endorsement of his products has made him a familiar face throughout the country. In spite of having gone public with his company, his fear of control is indicated by the fact that he has kept a majority position in the business. It is interesting to note how his sense of obligation mixed with his feelings of being close to others has come out in the open through his involvement in a number of social causes.

An individual with this personality make-up is obviously not suited for a traditional enterprise. Rules, regulations, and other constraints are anathema to him. His forte is the entrepreneurial mode. When he cannot assert himself, frustration follows. His venturesome behavior may be detrimental at a certain phase of growth of the enterprise. For example, given his fear of control, does he have the willingness to subject himself to the

Table III. SRIM Summary of Narratives^a

Assessor	1	2	3
Wishes, needs, intentions			
To assert oneself (independence and autonomy)	15	13	11
To be recognized	5	6	4
Responses from others			
N (
E (Dominating, intruding, interfering	9	8	11
G (
A (
T (Critical, disapproving	4	5	5
I (
V (
E (Unhelpful, inconsiderate	3	4	4
P (Supportive, reassuring	4	6	8
O (
S (Respectful	3	6	8
I (
T (Helpful, cooperative	4	8	5
I (
V (Being concerned	5	6	3
E (
Responses from self			
N (Dominated, fear of control	7	9	10
E (
G (Feeling less confident	4	6	3
A (
T (Feeling anxious	3	5	4
I (
V (Obligated	4	3	3
E (
(Frustrated	3	2	4
P (Being assertive	9	12	13
O (
S (Feeling self-confident	6	9	10
I (
T (Feeling happy	6	8	9
I (
V (Feeling close to others	5	6	6
E (

^aTen narratives are scored.

financial discipline that comes with accountability to shareholders? Will he accept the constraints put upon him by his new managing director? Will

he be able to delegate sufficiently with the increasing complexity of the enterprise? Given his need to be in the limelight will he be able to plan for management succession? We can predict from his SRIM scores that these issues will be problematic.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The above example demonstrates how, by using the Strategic Relationship Interview Method, we not only can systematize responses but also retain the complexity of an individual's personality make-up. In a fairly simplified way we can obtain very rich data. It permits us to go beyond mere observation and creates awareness about "deep" structure. The interpretation of the preoccupations behind symbolic statements will be of great help in better understanding the leader-strategy interface.

Another supporting argument for the use of this method is that in studies comparing self-report of main preoccupying themes with clinician-based identification, the individuals interviewed varied greatly in their ability to self-report (Luborsky & Crits-Christoph, 1985). The subjects being studied had difficulty in discriminating between themes of more or less importance to them. Moreover, in responding to certain "loaded" questions, specific defenses (of which the person was not necessarily aware) became operative, causing serious distortions. Exclusive reliance on self-report and questionnaire studies for the generation of data may therefore be fraught with problems.

Although the SRIM approach is still in an exploratory stage, it is a promising avenue for the further exploration of the links between leadership and strategy. It should be seen as a useful complement to the more traditional interview process. Its application allows for an additional level of complexity. This does not mean that it is an easy solution. Accurate assessment necessitates a considerable amount of skill and clinical insight, which are not developed overnight but take time and effort. We believe, however, that great rewards, in the form of richer and more accurate research output, await those scholars who are willing to help further develop this effort.

APPENDIX.

Instructions Given to the Interviewee

Understanding relationships is critical to our study of leadership and the strategy-making process. Please tell me about some incidents or events, each involving yourself in relation to another person. Each should be a specific incident. Some should be current and some old. For each one tell: (1) when it occurred, (2) the other person involved, (3)

some of what the other person said or did and what you said or did, and (4) what happened at the end.

The other person might be any family member, friend, subordinate, or other person you have business dealing with. It just has to be a specific event that was personally important to you or that created a problem for you in some way. We will tape at least 12 of these incidents. Spend about 3 minutes (but no more than 5) in telling each one. We will let you know when you come near to the end of 5 minutes. This is a way to tell us about your relationships. Make yourself comfortable as you would with someone who wants to get to know you (adapted from Luborsky & Crits-Christoph, 1985, pp. 9-10).

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Authoritarianism, Dominance, and Social Behavior: A Perspective from Evolutionary Personality Psychology

Robert D. Smither^{1,2}

The concept of authoritarianism has been widely misunderstood because of both confusion about values and science and disagreement about a definition of the concept within different areas of psychology. Research in cognitive and social psychology has focused on linking scores on authoritarianism scales with social behavior or information processing, but these efforts have not been very successful at either defining the concept or predicting behavior. In developmental research, authoritarian parenting refers to an emphasis on parental control and decision making. Organizational authoritarianism has been linked to higher productivity and, in some cases, with lower job satisfaction. One way of making sense of the variety of definitions of authoritarianism is in terms of evolutionary personality theory and the concepts of dominance and submission. These biological concepts are relevant to both human and animal behavior, and they can be used to explain authoritarianism in scientific, rather than pejorative, terms.

KEY WORDS: authoritarianism; evolutionary personality psychology; dominance; group behavior.

INTRODUCTION

One of the dangers inherent in all social science research is losing sight of the ways in which forces in society impact scientific inquiry and reporting. In psychology, a good example of social values influencing research is the study of authoritarianism. As a research topic, authoritarianism first became popular as a means for explaining events in Europe during the 1930's and 1940's (Stagner, 1936; Maslow, 1943), and it is still being researched today (Duckitt, 1989; Smither, 1991). However, much of

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what has appeared in the scientific journals, and particularly during the early years, was opinion and not science. Maslow, for example, went so far as to assert:

The authoritarian must be perpetually and insatiably ambitious. This means also that he can never be happy except for a time. For the democratic person this is not true. He can be happy because his most basic needs are satisfied. Moreover, the satisfactions he seeks are attainable, whereas the satisfactions the authoritarian seeks are unattainable, even theoretically (1943, p. 409).

Another victim of postwar sociological trends was Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford's (1950) massive work, *The authoritarian personality*. Originally conceived as an attempt to understand anti-Semitism in the 1940's, and greatly influenced by the work of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory in the 1930's, *The authoritarian personality* detailed the qualities and behaviors associated with what the researchers felt was a largely undesirable personality syndrome (Sanford, 1986). Despite later critiques of the study that questioned many of its conclusions (Brown, 1965; Christie & Jahoda, 1954; McKinney, 1973; Rokeach, 1960), the *concept* of the authoritarian personality remains important today, as evidenced, for example, by its coverage in current introductory psychology textbooks (e.g., Bernstein, Roy, Srull, & Wickens, 1991; Crooks & Stein, 1991; Dworetzky, 1991; Gleitman, 1991; Peterson, 1991).

Interestingly, in the 800 pages that constitute *The authoritarian personality*, the meaning of the word "authoritarian" is never clearly defined. The study concludes with information about attitudes held by authoritarians and some hypotheses about where the authoritarian personality syndrome originates, but it fails to identify exactly what constitutes authoritarian behavior or attributes. This failure by Adorno and his associates to define the concept precisely has adversely affected research in the area. In a review of studies in authoritarianism, Kirscht and Dillehay (1967) stated:

The concept and execution of research in this area has suffered from the fact that authoritarianism, as it is currently formulated, is a relatively poor explanatory variable. . . . In fact, the concept has so many different aspects that investigators lack a common core of established meaning and often assume connections among various dispositions that have never been examined satisfactorily (1967, p. 131).

Over the years, the concept of authoritarianism has taken on a variety of new meanings, all of which have some similarity, but each with a special nuance. For example, Baumrind (1971) adapted the authoritarian concept to descriptions of parenting styles; Rokeach (1960), Eckhardt (1988), Sidanius (1978) and others have linked cognitive style and authoritarianism; Duckitt (1989) has explained authoritarianism in terms of group cohesion; and Likert (1961), Bass (1990), and Smither (1991, in press) have discussed authoritarian forms of organizational leadership. In each of these approaches,

authoritarianism has a meaning that is unique to its author or the psychological domain under consideration.

One newer area where the concept of authoritarianism appears to be relevant, but where it has not been widely applied, is evolutionary personality theory. Evolutionary theory, as represented by Buss (1991), Buss and Plomin (1975, 1984), Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1989), Hogan (1982; Hogan, Jones, & Cheek, 1985; Hogan & Smither, in press), and others, focuses on evolutionary and biological factors that affect human psychological development and interaction.

Although authoritarian behavior is always, by definition, considered in terms of social interaction, most research suggests that its roots lie in personality—in temperamental influences or experiences in early life that affect the way a person interacts with others. In both its personal and interpersonal usages, however, authoritarianism is related to the quality of dominance. Dominance, in turn, is an important concept in evolutionary personality theory because it is a universal lexical feature of human language (White, 1980) and is also related to aspects of personality and social behavior such as status within the group (Hogan, 1982), sexual attractiveness (Sadalla, Kenrick, & Vershure, 1987), and managerial effectiveness (Megargee & Carbonell, 1988). Consequently, an evolutionary interpretation of authoritarianism, dominance, and social behavior may clarify some of the longstanding confusions in this area of psychological research.

This paper considers how the concept of authoritarianism has been reflected in developmental, cognitive, social, and organizational psychology and offers a new interpretation, based in evolutionary personality psychology, of authoritarianism and its origin.

QUALITIES OF THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY

Sanford (1956), one of the authors of *The authoritarian personality*, later commented that the book was wrongly titled, since the researchers were actually addressing potential fascism rather than personality qualities. In fact, the goal of the research was rather modest: “the development of scales that would express in quantitative terms expanding conceptions of what prejudice involves, clinical study of individuals scoring at the extremes on these scales, and the subsequent revision of the scales” (pp. 263-264).

Measurement of the authoritarian personality was accomplished through the *F* Scale, an instrument developed by Adorno and his associates to identify the qualities they believed characteristic of authoritarians. Severe criticism of the psychometric properties of the original *F* Scale (Hyman &

Sheatsley, 1954; Rokeach, 1960; Altemeyer, 1981) has led to its modification and the development of similar instruments without its structural weaknesses. In most modern authoritarianism research, however, the methodology is basically the same as that of Adorno and his associates—authoritarianism scores are correlated with some other measure of attitudes or behavior.

The research of Adorno et al. culminated in the identification of nine qualities of the potential authoritarian, and the recognition of certain “character types” associated with persons high and low in authoritarian tendencies. The nine authoritarian qualities are: (1) conventionalism, (2) submission, (3) aggressiveness, (4) anti-intraception, or disapproval of emotionality, intellectualism, or impracticalities, (5) superstition, (6) power and toughness, (7) destructiveness and cynicism, (8) projection, and (9) sex—a preoccupation with sexual matters and indignation at violations of sexual norms.

Although Adorno and his associates considered these nine to be the defining qualities of the authoritarian personality, some additional characteristics emerged from the research, including an inability to accept blame, self-pity, a tendency to view interpersonal relations in terms of power and status rather than love or friendship, undifferentiated ideas about members of the opposite sex, and a tendency to focus on somatic, rather than psychological, complaints (Sanford, 1956).

The Origins of Authoritarianism in the Individual

Although Erich Fromm and Wilhelm Reich, both psychoanalysts who deviated from Freud’s teachings, were not associated with Adorno and his group at the time of the research, their ideas about the family, repression, and authoritarianism clearly influenced the theoretical underpinnings of *The authoritarian personality* (Samelson, 1986). Basing his ideas chiefly in Marxist thought, Fromm (1941) maintained that the family preserves the social order by enforcing a reverence for authority, a longing for discipline, and, at the same time, a strange need for rebellion against society. Being authoritarian, Fromm suggested, was one way of avoiding the loneliness endemic to an industrial society.

Reich (1970), on the other hand, felt that sexual repression was the basis of authoritarianism. The patriarchal nature of society reproduced authoritarianism by instilling sexual inhibition and fear in the child. Coupled with economic exploitation, sexual repression led to conservatism, a fear of freedom, and predilections for authoritarian submission and dominance. In Reich’s view, repressed sexuality also led to a yearning for the mystical—religion, duty, honor, motherhood, and nation.

Although influenced by Fromm and Reich, Adorno and his associates were less interested in understanding societal forces and more in the intrapsychic roots of authoritarianism. The theoretical foundation of the study was psychoanalysis, and ego psychology in particular (Sanford, 1956), and hence it is not surprising that the researchers attributed the genesis of authoritarianism to parenting behaviors. Adorno et al. concluded that fathers of high authoritarian men were usually distant and stern, whereas their mothers were kind, self-sacrificing, and submissive. In most cases, these mothers were models of conventional morality, the standards of which they rigidly enforced within the family.

According to Adorno et al., persons high in authoritarianism came from homes where the father dominated, and discipline was harsh, threatening, or traumatic. During interviews, high authoritarians initially presented an idealized picture of their homelife — denying conflict between their parents, for example — but negative information eventually emerged in the course of the interview.

In a later paper, Sanford (1956) summarized the conclusions of the research group about the origins of the authoritarian personality. As children, adult authoritarians had endured punishments that they regarded as unjustified. Because of this, they developed strongly ambivalent feelings toward authority — they learned to submit at the same time that they resented their submission. In later years, their aggressive feelings were directed at outgroups, achieving sadistic gratification at the punishment of others. In reviewing the work of his research group, Sanford concluded that the underlying drives that were most involved in authoritarianism were “aggression, dependence, submission, passivity, and homosexuality” (1956, p. 309).

Evaluation of the Authoritarian Personality

As suggested above, criticisms of the work of Adorno and his associates have greatly diminished its usefulness. These criticisms — of its psychoanalytic bias, its disregard of leftist authoritarianism (Shils, 1954), and especially of its methodology (Hyman and Sheatsley, 1954) — have more or less rendered *The authoritarian personality* an interesting, but generally inconclusive, research project in the history of psychology. Overall, researchers have been unable to discover a personality syndrome that fits the authoritarian described by Adorno et al. Certainly authoritarian traits exist and co-exist in individuals, but evidence for either a character type or a set of behaviors that could be labeled authoritarian has been elusive.

Nevertheless, Adorno and his associates introduced a concept that seems to have powerful intuitive appeal to researchers in psychology, political science, and other areas. In the decades following the appearance of *The authoritarian personality*, hundreds of studies have considered authoritarianism and its measurement (Altemeyer, 1981; Christie & Johoda, 1954; Kirscht & Dillehay, 1967; Snyder & Ickes, 1985). Many of these applications, and particularly more modern studies, have moved away from Sanford's (1956) hypothesized "aggression, dependence, submission, passivity and homosexuality" that characterize the authoritarian personality and toward definitions that are unique to the context being studied. Some of these contexts are discussed below.

AUTHORITARIANISM IN COGNITIVE AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH

As suggested above, initial enthusiasm for authoritarianism as a personality syndrome declined as researchers attempted to link high scores on authoritarianism scales with specific behaviors. Most studies that focused on demonstrating a relationship between *F* Scale scores and behavior were unsuccessful (Altemeyer, 1981), with one notable exception being Elms and Milgram's (1966) finding that authoritarians were more punitive in experimental situations.

As suggested earlier, one of the major problems in measuring authoritarianism has been the *F* Scale, the instrument developed by Adorno et al. in their original research. One of the best known attempts to improve the *F* Scale and clarify the confusion associated with authoritarian research was Rokeach's (1960) *D* Scale or measure of dogmatism. Rather than measuring fascistic thinking, however, the *D* Scale was intended to identify belief systems that were closed to modification irrespective of an individual's political ideology. Although the psychometric properties of the *D* Scale were somewhat more robust than those of the *F* Scale, the *D* Scale also largely failed to link authoritarianism—or dogmatism—with social behavior (Altemeyer, 1981).

In his description of the development of the *D* Scale, Rokeach (1960) raised an interesting hypothesis about the origin of authoritarianism. In his view, ideologies in general are socially-derived, but each person evaluates ideologies in terms of "highly personalized pre-ideological beliefs" (p. 35). These pre-ideological beliefs seem to originate in personality rather than the individual's social environment. Rokeach's failure to develop this idea—which links the personality and social aspects of authoritarianism—has been criticized by a number of researchers (Billig, 1977; Billig & Cochrane, 1979; Cochrane, Billig, & Hogg, 1979). Nonetheless, Rokeach's concept of

dogmatism appears directly related to the quality of dominance, which, as suggested above, is a key component of authoritarianism.

In a widely-cited review of authoritarianism research, Altemeyer (1981) found no evidence that (1) authoritarians have a particularly strong need to conform, (2) social behavior can be predicted on the basis of *F* Scale scores, or (3) authoritarianism is related to social class. Overall, the assertion of Adorno et al. that authoritarians demonstrate a rigidity of thinking characterized by hostility to intellectualism and fantasy and a reliance on stereotypes has been largely unsupported. As was the case with authoritarianism as a personality syndrome, a cognitive style characteristic of authoritarians has been difficult to identify. In general, support for a linkage between authoritarianism scores and rigidity and intolerance of ambiguity has been limited to tasks that involve geometric relationships or solving logical problems, but not to social attitudes or predicting behavior in groups (Altemeyer, 1981; Ray, 1988).

Perhaps the clearest linkage between authoritarian views and social attitudes is in terms of ethnic prejudice. Several studies have demonstrated that persons who score high on authoritarian scales also score high on measures of racism (e.g. Ashmore & DelBoca, 1976; Ehrlich, 1973; Linville & Jones, 1980; Maykovich, 1975; Sidanius, 1978). In addition, people with high authoritarian scores have a tendency to be aggressive toward unconventional or low status people and also demonstrate higher levels of ethnocentrism.

Sidanius (1988), for example, has related the ethnic prejudice aspect of authoritarianism to various cognitive operations. In his view, racism is linked to cognitive rigidity, intolerance of ambiguity, tendency toward premature cognitive closure, preference for perceptual simplicity over complexity, abstract reasoning ability, and inaccuracy in the perception of others. However, authoritarians do not usually demonstrate these qualities outside the specific context of ethnocentrism.

Some other studies of authoritarianism and social attitudes include Eckhardt (1988), who concluded that high *F* scorers tend to be ultra-conservative, conventionally religious, and oriented toward business careers, and Eysenck and Wilson (1978), who noted that, in certain individuals, authoritarianism overlaps with dogmatism, Machiavellianism, ethnocentricity, tough-mindedness, and conservatism.

Finally, a more recent approach to understanding authoritarianism is in terms of interpersonal, rather than cognitive, processes. Duckitt (1989) argued that identifying the traits of the authoritarian individual has proved elusive because authoritarianism is better understood as an aspect of group cohesion. In his view, the work on authoritarianism as a personality syndrome has suffered because it was done without consideration of the social

milieu — such as a work environment — in which authoritarian behavior is demonstrated.

Duckitt argues that Altemeyer's (1981) factor analysis of *F* Scale results do support three of Adorno et al.'s original constructs: conventionalism, authoritarian submission, and authoritarian aggression. These constructs can be used to understand the ingroup/outgroup dichotomy that typifies authoritarianism.

Conventionalism results in conformity with ingroup norms and rules of conduct; authoritarian submission results in respect and unconditional obedience to ingroup leaders; and authoritarian aggression is the result of intolerance and punitiveness toward people who do not conform to the norms and rules of the ingroup. Carrying this argument a step further, competition between groups is likely to result in more extreme behavior related to conventionalism and authoritarian submission and dominance, as well as the readiness of groups and members to accept more centralized leadership (Mulder & Stermerding, 1963; Rabbie & Wilkens, 1971). Authoritarianism, with its intolerance of people who are different, is simply an extreme form of group cohesion. A shortcoming of this interpretation, however, is its failure to consider the factors that make extreme group cohesion desirable to an individual.

One final area of social psychological research that may be helpful in understanding authoritarianism is social categorization theory (Tajfel & Billig, 1974; Tajfel, Flament, Billig, & Bundy, 1971; Turner, 1987, 1984) and the related concept of self-categorization (Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg, & Turner, 1990; Turner, 1987). Although traditional theory has maintained that interpersonal attraction is the basis of group cohesion, a number of experiments (Ferguson & Kelley, 1966; Hogg & Turner, 1985; Tajfel & Billig, 1974; Tajfel et al., 1971) have demonstrated that member attraction may be secondary to other factors. According to social categorization theory, intergroup competitiveness arises simply from being a member of one of two or more groups. In one study (Allen & Wilder, 1975), for example, members of groups were more likely to favor ingroup members with dissimilar views than outgroup members with similar views. Self-categorization (Hogg & Turner, 1987) occurs as individuals alter their self-perceptions and behaviors to fit the perceived expectations of the group.

Although the relevance of social categorization theory to authoritarianism has not been tested empirically, it is easy to see a possible linkage. Social categorization suggests that, in many cases, group membership holds a valence that transcends similarities between individuals. Consequently, group members may be willing to tolerate or engage in extreme behaviors — such as domination or submission — in order to maintain the unique

group environment. In a sense, social categorization theory complements Duckitt's views on authoritarianism as extreme group cohesion. By itself, however, this approach—like Rokeach's (1960)—does not address the question of individual predisposition toward dominance or submission within the group environment. Self-categorization, on the other hand, does link individual with group behavior: As the group environment grows more authoritarian, for example, individuals are likely to shift their perceptions about themselves as well.

Evaluating the Cognitive and Social Psychological View of Authoritarianism

Overall, social psychology researchers have not been particularly successful in linking the alleged qualities of authoritarians with social behavior. In terms of cognition, the only finding verified by a number of researchers is the proclivity of authoritarians to hold racist views or to be hostile to other groups. In a majority of studies, the hypothesis that authoritarians have a uniquely rigid cognitive style has not been supported.

Duckitt's view of authoritarianism as extreme group cohesion and the research in social and self-categorization theory offer promising avenues for further study, particularly in linking the personality aspects of authoritarianism with the social aspects. Nonetheless, these approaches by themselves do not yet provide an understanding of authoritarianism as an individual difference variable.

THE AUTHORITARIAN PARENT

Do authoritarian parents produce nascent fascists? For Adorno and his associates, and for Fromm and Reich before them, authoritarian parents create an atmosphere of domination and submission that children carry into adulthood and, assumably, inflict on their own children, creating a new generation of fascists. Although few modern developmental psychologists link parental control and adult political ideology, several have used the concept of authoritarianism as a means of studying parenting styles.

In a series of influential papers, Baumrind (1971; 1968; 1967) presented evidence for three categorizations of parental authority which she labelled authoritarian, permissive, and authoritative. According to Baumrind, these parenting styles had important effects on children's behavior.

Authoritarian parents attempt to control and evaluate their child's behavior in accordance with their beliefs about a code of conduct. These

parents value obedience and favor punitive actions when children violate the behavioral code. Respect for authority, work, and the preservation of order and tradition are important values that are taught to the child. According to Baumrind (1971), such parents do not encourage parent-child discussions, believing instead that children should accept their parents' views about what is right. In her research, Baumrind noted that children who were discontented, withdrawn, and distrustful had authoritarian parents.

Permissive parents attempt to be nonpunitive, accepting, and affirming toward the child's impulses. Such parents explain family rules and make few demands for household responsibility or orderly behavior, and they use reason, rather than power, to accomplish their goals. According to Baumrind, children of permissive parents were the least self-reliant, explorative, and self-controlled.

Finally, *authoritative parents* direct the activities of their children, encouraging both autonomy and disciplined conformity. The authoritative parent exerts firm control, using both power and reason to achieve objectives. Overall, authoritative parents are warm and rational, exhibiting high control along with positive encouragement of their children. Baumrind found the children of authoritative parents to be the most self-reliant, self-controlled, explorative, and content.

Although Baumrind does not appear to regard authoritarianism as the optimal parenting style, she does not link it with the serious personality problems identified by Adorno et al. For example, one study (Baumrind, 1968) found that authoritarian upbringing did not affect the development of competence, but did discourage the development of independence in girls and social responsibility in boys.

In another study that looked at differences in childrearing practices in Black and White homes, however, Baumrind (1972) noted an anomaly in the effects of the authoritarian parenting. In this study, parents of Black children appeared to be more authoritarian, practicing firm enforcement and even being somewhat rejecting of their children. Contrary to expectation, however, Black girls were more independent and at ease in nursery school, played more aggressively and ebulliently, and exhibited greater social maturity than their White counterparts. At the same time, authoritarian Black parents were much less emotionally constrained than White parents.

Inherent in Adorno et al.'s description of the authoritarian personality is the theme of anti-intellectualism. Theoretically, parental anti-intraception would be likely to result in lowered school achievement. In a large study ($N = 7836$) relating parenting style to adolescent school performance, Dornbush, Ritter, Leiderman, Roberts, and Fraleigh (1987) did find a

negative relationship between authoritarian parenting and grades—the more authoritarian the parents, the lower the child's achievement. Authoritarian parenting was not the most damaging to school achievement, however. Families where the parents were inconsistent in their parenting styles, mixing authoritarianism with permissiveness, produced children who received the lowest grades.

As was the case with Baumrind's (1972) study of the Black schoolgirls, the research of Dornbusch et al. suggests that race mitigates the effects of authoritarian parenting. Asian students, for example, reported higher levels of authoritarian parenting and lower levels of authoritative parenting, yet as a group, the Asians were receiving high grades in school. At the same time, the parenting style of Blacks did not seem to be related to school achievement. Finally, the grades of Hispanic females seemed to suffer under authoritarian parents, but not the grades of Hispanic males. In fact, only with the White group did authoritarian parenting have a clearly negative effect on the grades of both males and females. From these studies, it appears that the interrelationship between authoritarian parenting, race, and achievement are not yet clarified.

Finally, in a review of studies of firm control, Lewis (1981) concluded that such control is essential for the development of effective socialization, and of self-esteem in particular. Summarizing the research, Lewis argued that parental firm control appears to be a requisite for self-esteem in 12-year-old boys (Coopersmith, 1967); for competence in nursery school children (Baumrind, 1967); and with dominant and achievement-oriented behavior in girls, and friendly and achievement-oriented behavior in boys of nursery school age.

Evaluating the Authoritarian Parent

Two conclusions from the research regarding authoritarianism and parenting styles are apparent. First, it is easy to see that the definition of authoritarianism used in parenting research differs from that used in other research areas. For example, the developmental literature makes no linkage to drives toward aggression, dependence, submission, passivity and homosexuality (Sanford, 1956), nor to the ethnocentrism that other researchers (Ray, 1988) have suggested characterize the authoritarian. At least in terms of parenting styles, authoritarianism has a unique meaning that emphasizes respect for traditional values and parental responsibility for decision making.

A second obvious conclusion is that authoritarianism in parents is not always bad, and, surprisingly, may sometimes be desirable. In Baumrind's (1972) study, authoritarian parenting seemed to improve the competence

of Black girls. Similarly, her study of white children (Baumrind, 1971) indicated that authoritarianism did not appear to affect levels of competence, but did correlate with lower levels of independence in girls and social responsibility in boys. Dornbusch et al. (1987) found authoritarianism to be related to school achievement only with certain groups, and even then not always in a negative way. Reiterating what was suggested above, the inter-relationship between authoritarian parenting, race, and achievement is not yet clear.

In summary, developmental research regarding authoritarian parenting is strikingly different from the conclusions of Adorno et al. From the developmental perspective, authoritarianism may not be the optimal parenting style, but it obviously does not automatically lead to the development of potential fascists, nor is there something psychologically wrong with parents who use such a style. Although some findings of developmental research are still open to interpretation, they do tend to support the view that, in certain cases, authoritarian parenting can have positive outcomes.

AUTHORITARIANISM IN WORK ORGANIZATIONS

Since at least the 1960's, authoritarianism has generally been considered an undesirable and ineffective management style. Likert (1961, 1967), the preeminent human relations management theorist, identified four types of managers whose most distinguishable characteristic seems to be the amount of worker participation in decision making that they allowed. Instead of using the word "authoritarian," however, Likert labeled his two more extreme styles "exploitative authoritative" and "benevolent authoritative." Likert held an extremely negative view of exploitative authoritative managers, characterizing them as follows: (1) using fear, threats, and punishments to motivate workers; (2) creating an organizational climate of fear and distrust; (3) making the majority of decisions at the top without input from subordinates; and (4) relying on information that comes from above and ignoring that which comes from below. Benevolent authoritarians were somewhat better: they motivated through occasional rewards, created a climate of fear and caution, allowed operational decisions to be made at lower levels, and attended to communications from both higher and middle levels of the organization, but not from the bottom.

Perhaps the most significant factor in Likert's typology relates to productivity and job satisfaction. Although Likert argued that a participative environment enhances productivity, subsequent research on the effects of participation (Dachler & Wilpert, 1978; Locke & Schweiger, 1979; Locke, Schweiger, & Latham, 1986; Melcher, 1976; Wagner & Gooding, 1986) has

suggested that, at best, participation has a marginal effect on productivity. Overall, participation as a management style seems to be more effective in large organizations with strong corporate cultures than in smaller organizations, where managerial resources are fewer (Muczyk & Reimann, 1988). In fact, authoritarian management is not uncommon among smaller organizations.

Organizations where managers retain exclusive control of decision making and motivate through rewards and punishments have been described by Walton & Hackman (1986) as “control” organizations. In these environments, hierarchies, rules, status, and procedures are emphasized. Since direction comes from above, employees have few concerns about productivity matters; rather, the social function of the workgroup appears to be to protect its members from management and occasionally to enforce social norms about productivity. Other approaches to management that emphasize managerial control include directive leadership (Muczyk & Reimann, 1988) and instrumental leadership (Nadler & Tuchman, 1990).

In a review of research regarding authoritarian management, Smither (1991) defined authoritarianism in the work setting as the practice of taking full responsibility for decisions and usually for subordinate performance as well. Such control may or may not be associated with punishment. Authoritarian managers exhibit an extreme reliance on roles—they believe their job is to make decisions and see that these decisions are carried out. Overall, the authoritarian manager has little interest in sharing power with subordinates, and the organizational climate may be productive or unproductive.

Recent research regarding leadership effectiveness (Bass, 1985; Conger, Kanungo, and Associates, 1988) suggests that domination by a leader with a powerful personality can have salutary effects on both an organization and its members. In both the charismatic and transformational leadership models, the personal goals of workers are transformed into broader goals that are in keeping with the organizational mission. Although participation may be a part of these models, workers willingly submit to the increased demands that their leaders make on them.

Evaluating Authoritarian Management

Although Likert’s description of the authoritative work environment holds some resemblance to the authoritarianism of Adorno et al., more recent writing about authoritarian—or control, directive, or instrumental—management has little in common with the conceptualization of the potential fascist. The authoritarian work environment is defined by its focus on obedience and strict adherence to traditional roles. Authoritarian

managers make the decisions and use their power to see that subordinates carry out these decisions. Given this definition, it is possible to see some linkage between the definition of the authoritarian manager and the authoritarian parent.

Are authoritarian managers effective? Although many people object to a directive management style, evidence for its ineffectiveness is not apparent. In fact, a review of research on the California Psychological Inventory (CPI; Gough, 1957; Megargee & Carbonell, 1988) concluded that elevated scores on dominance—a quality associated with authoritarianism (see below)—are necessary for managerial success. Another review of recent research in the areas of worker participation, organizational effectiveness, and charismatic and transformational leadership (Smither, 1991) suggested that, in the right context, authoritarianism can be quite effective at accomplishing organizational goals. Finally, in a discussion of research regarding authoritarian leadership, Bass (1990) concluded that most employees are happier working under more democratic management, but that authoritarian direction may result in heightened productivity.

The relationship between authoritarian management and job satisfaction is not straightforward, however. Whereas the majority of employees express a preference for a democratic milieu, many others choose to belong to authoritarian institutions such as the military or some religious orders. Along the same lines, many individuals prefer to work in environments where they do not have responsibility for decision making (Smither, 1989). Overall, the management literature suggests that the success of authoritarianism may be greatly affected by the qualities of the person who practices it.

AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH TO AUTHORITARIANISM

Evolutionary personality psychology (Buss, 1991; Buss & Plomin, 1984, 1975; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989; Hogan, 1982; Hogan & Smither, in press; Scarr, 1987; Tellegen, 1985; Tompkins, 1962, 1963) is an emerging view of human nature focusing on “psychological mechanisms and behavioral strategies evolved as solutions to the adaptive problems our species has faced over millions of years” (Buss, 1991, pp. 459-60). Largely influenced by Darwin, evolutionary personality psychologists seek to identify psychological dimensions having behavioral consequences that, historically, led to reproductive success. Other behaviors of evolutionary significance are the formation of alliances and the establishment of hierarchies (Buss, 1986). In particular, the human motivation to establish hierarchies is the factor linking authoritarianism with evolutionary personality psychology.

According to the evolutionary perspective, people are born with certain motivations that, through consciousness, are given expression. Rather than focusing solely on instinctual needs for food, water, sex, etc., evolutionary personality theorists also seek to explain human social behavior—such as the formation of hierarchies—through innate drives. These drives constitute a genetic predisposition toward certain personality characteristics that are modified as a person develops. For example, an infant may be born with a disposition toward high levels of energy which may or may not be encouraged by the environment into which he or she is born.

Evolutionary personality theorists have different views on the instincts that are innate to humans. Tompkins (1987), for example, proposes that humans are born with nine basic emotions (enjoyment, interest, fear, surprise, distress, disgust, anger, shame, and guilt); Tellegen (1985) argues for three (positive affectivity, negative affectivity, restraint); and Buss and Plomin (1975, 1984) hypothesize three temperaments (emotionality, sociability, and activity). Irrespective of the number of instincts, however, all evolutionary personality theorists agree, however, that complex social behavior as an adult is merely an elaboration of these basic motivations.

Hogan et al. (1985) and Hogan & Smither (in press) has proposed a model of human social behavior that fits within an evolutionary perspective. In his view, humans are born with innate needs to be accepted as members of a group and to enhance their status within their groups. That is, humans are biologically disposed to co-exist in social groups, but within each group, individuals strive to gain the attention and approval of their fellow members. This motivation has its biological roots in the prehistoric need for survival; humans who could not fit into the group were unlikely to survive. Although the issue of survival is much less relevant today, certainly the quality of an individual's life is affected by the degree of his or her acceptance by the group.

According to Hogan (1979), dominance is a critical aspect of group relations: “. . . every primate and human group of modest complexity is organized in terms of a status hierarchy. Each member of the group knows who is most dominant or has the highest status, who is lowest, and where he or she stands in the hierarchy.” Along the same lines, Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1989) argues that the need to dominate others in one's group, to achieve “rank,” and to win esteem are innate human motives.

Authoritarianism, Dominance, and Social Behavior

Throughout all the approaches to authoritarianism discussed in this paper, dominance and submission have been major themes. In terms of personality, ethnocentrism, group cohesion, parenting styles, or managerial

performance, authoritarianism requires one individual or group to be dominant over others. According to evolutionary personality psychology, the human propensity for dominance is quite similar to the status hierarchy that is found in all groups of social animals. In human groups, as in animal, individuals seek to enhance their status by dominating others. At the same time, they recognize situations where submission is more status-enhancing. In either case, the biological goal is survival, but the social goal is enhanced interpersonal relations.

Recasting authoritarianism as a strategy for status enhancement within the group solves a number of problems related to understanding authoritarianism. First, it recognizes that dominance and submission are natural parts of human existence, and that neither directive parents or managers—nor submissive children or employees—are maladjusted. Although extreme cases of either directiveness or submissiveness might be unhealthy, it is illogical to suggest that satisfaction derived from giving or following orders is necessarily pathological. The evolutionary view of authoritarianism removes much of the pejorativeness of the research in this area.

Second, explaining authoritarianism in terms of a drive for enhanced social relations explains why the effects of authoritarian parenting vary between ethnic groups. Within specific groups, submission enhances status; in others, it detracts. As sociologists and anthropologists have readily demonstrated, each subgroup of the population has its own patterns of ritualized social interaction. Values taught through social interaction vary from culture to culture, and what passes for authoritarianism in one milieu may be interpreted as helpful direction in another. Interpretation of authoritarianism as an effort to enhance standing within the group requires an understanding of the context in which authoritarian dominance or submission occurs—a position argued by Sidanius (1985).

Third, an evolutionary approach to the question of authoritarianism addresses the problems of ethnocentrism and racism. Individuals who are hostile to others obviously feel their own status is jeopardized. Following Duckitt's (1989) line of argument, authoritarianism may be considered as extreme social cohesion if cohesion is seen as a means to enhance the status of the individual. The conventionalism, need for submission, and need for aggression that Altemeyer (1981) found in his factor analysis of *F* Scale results are understandable in the context of a threat to the fabric of a group when members have established their own patterns of dominance and submission. This explanation is congruent with both social and self-categorization theory (Tajfel et al., 1971; Turner, 1987), which considers group process in terms of the categories by which group members define themselves both individually and as group members.

Fourth, looking at authoritarianism in terms of evolutionary personality psychology explains an anomaly in organizational theory. Whereas much of modern psychology focuses on the importance of the individual and his or her need for self-expression, it is also clear that many individuals are content to be members of authoritarian organizations or even subject to authoritarian governments. These organizations and governments may be repressive, but they can also be highly effective in accomplishing their missions. Again, being at the extremes may be unhealthy, but there is nothing inherently pathological in seeking a comfortable level of domination or submission within the context of one's own group.

Finally, an evolutionary personality psychology interpretation of the origins of authoritarianism as a personal quality seems more plausible than a psychoanalytic explanation. Assuming dominance is a genetic predisposition that is modified by experience, authoritarianism would seem to be the endpoint on the dominance–submission continuum. Like the quality extraversion, dominance is innately more powerful in some individuals than others. In its extreme form, dominance may be pathological, but this is in no way always the case. As suggested above, authoritarianism can enhance individual, group, parental, or organizational functioning in some cases.

SUMMARY

The study of authoritarianism began as a response to political movements in Europe in the 1930's and 1940's and to anti-Semitism in the United States, but because the concept was never clearly defined, research in the area became fractionated into specialized meanings. Inherent in all the meanings, however, was the concept of domination and submission, and the belief that authoritarian practices are somehow contrary to human nature or harmful to individuals.

Establishing a social hierarchy is, in fact, a naturally occurring process found in both human and animal groups. In the quest to enhance one's standing within the group, humans may be inclined to dominate in some settings, submit in others. As is the case with most social behaviors, extremes are probably detrimental, but the practice of dominating and submitting is necessary for effective group functioning.

Given these considerations, authoritarianism is probably more accurately defined as a preference for social behavior or roles that emphasize dominance and submission. This preference for authoritarianism is the product of an innate need to enhance one's standing in the group and is influenced by the behavior—the degree of dominance or submission—that the individual feels raises his or her status with other group members.

As such, authoritarianism is not inherently negative, but takes on a negative connotation when it violates the norms of the group or the rights of an outgroup.

Finally, given the research in different areas of psychology, authoritarianism should not be considered solely in terms of personality, but rather as an interaction between individual and environment. People with a high need for dominance or submission will find the appropriateness—or, in evolutionary psychology terms, success—of their behavior determined by the norms of the group in which they operate. For the most part, it will be the social milieu that determines the acceptability and effectiveness of authoritarian behavior.

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Conflicting Ideologies: Structural and Motivational Consequences

Susan C. Schneider^{1,2}

Conflicting ideologies are revealed in different beliefs about how to design organizations. Beliefs regarding, for example, the extent of centralization of decision making and specialization of roles and tasks, in turn, influence motivation and behavior. This paper demonstrates how ideology influences organizational structure and the behavioral consequences by comparing the "medical" and "community" models of mental health care delivery. Although rational arguments would suggest that organizational structure, in terms of degrees of centralization and specialization, should be determined by goals and technologies, the ambiguity of these goals and technologies encourages organizational structure to be driven by ideology. Conflicting ideologies need to be incorporated so that the tension thus created will encourage the emergence of a different perspective on mental health service delivery.

KEY WORDS: ideologies; organization design; mental health care.

INTRODUCTION

Changing environments demand changes in organizational design. According to rational argument, dynamic environments and non-routine tasks require organizations that are loosely coupled, decentralized, and more organic in design (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Perrow, 1970, 1986; Weick, 1976; Mintzberg, 1979). Yet designing organizations in the face of these conditions seems to be constrained by powerful invisible forces. These forces apparently are "rational myths," or socially defined rules and belief systems, which influence organizational behavior, more so than do goals and technologies. These rules and belief systems, accepted and

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promoted based on the authority of government agencies or professional associations, provide organizational legitimacy which can become a more important criteria of performance than either effectiveness or efficiency (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Meyer & Scott, 1983; Zucker, 1983; or see Scott, 1987 for a review).

Organizations, however, live in “fragmented” environments wherein different stakeholders impose different demands which may represent conflicting beliefs regarding appropriate structure and behavior (Meyer, Scott, & Strang, 1987). As institutional fields vary in terms of the strength and compatibility of these rational myths, organizations reflect tensions created within as this differentiation gets incorporated in conflicting practices. The existence of a set of differentiated and specialized cognitive and normative systems — institutional logics — makes different repertoires available to individuals and organizations to use in pursuit of their own interests (Friedland & Alford, 1991). Thus the task requirements confront the institutional logics and the organizational setting can become a political battlefield. As there are multiple institutional agents, e.g., state, community, and professional associations, any given activity can have multiple meanings and can be the focus of conflicting and contradictory institutional definitions and demands. Which agents define structure reflects the political contest of competing interests and reveals the varied role that political and legal structures play in shaping institutional fields (Scott, 1986).

Ideologies can have a profound effect on strategy, structure, and motivation (Bartunek, 1984; Sapienza, 1985; Meyer, 1982). There is a need to demonstrate how the “ruling myths” of institutional fields influence organizational structure and behavior. This paper will describe different models of mental health service delivery — the medical and community model — for which there are different and conflicting “ruling myths.” These ruling myths influence organization design and practice, such as degree of centralization of decision making and specialization of task and role, which in turn affect professional identity, morale, and behavior. Furthermore, as structural features are in a reciprocal relationship with individual’s actions and understanding, structure both legitimizes and constrains action (Giddens, 1979). It is argued that ideology needs to be surfaced and evaluated in terms of the task requirements, the clinical goals (appropriate treatment), and administrative goals (appropriate utilization of staff). Rather than being locked into competing camps, conflicting ideologies can be used to manage these often conflicting goals. Perhaps the tensions created by conflicting

ideologies can be used to push toward a new perspective in mental health service delivery.

THE CASE OF MENTAL HEALTH SERVICE DELIVERY³

The tensions created by changing environments and conflicting ideologies can clearly be seen in the case of mental health service delivery in the context of deinstitutionalization in the U.S. (Kiesler et al., 1983; Schneider, 1984). Initiated at the state level and becoming federal (national level) policy in the early 1960s, deinstitutionalization moved the locus of care of the chronic psychiatric and mentally retarded patients from isolated, state hospital facilities into the community — moving from custodial care to community care. This initiative was driven, in part, by economic rationality as it was less costly to provide care for patients in the community, by the failure of the medical profession to provide “cure” (Abbott, 1988), and by the failure of “total institutions” (Goffman, 1961). The “community care model” also evolved in line with the “grass roots” and civil liberties movements of the 1960s which emphasized local responsibility (not as wards of the state) and patient’s rights (their right to treatment as well as their right to refuse treatment). However, as state hospital employees followed the patients into the community, they brought with them their shared beliefs regarding patient care, “custodial model.” For example, placement of former state hospital patients into urban SRO’s (single room occupancy hotels) created community “snake pits,” the term used to refer to the horrors of the state hospital facilities.

The local treatment facilities, e.g., city or private voluntary hospitals, provided a more active treatment approach, “medical model,” which operated under different “ruling myths.” This created conflict around who, where, and how to care for the chronic psychiatric patient (Schneider, 1984). It also created problems in designing new programs to provide services within the community as these services were embedded (sometimes physically located) in acute care settings wherein patients and employees had different shared beliefs and expectations about their roles and responsibilities. These different shared beliefs derived from different ruling myths of mental health service delivery: the medical model and the community model.

³The preceding discussion is based upon personal experience (6 years) as staff psychologist and then director of a state psychiatric outpatient clinic and a CMHC partial hospital program.

Models of Mental Health Service Delivery

The “medical model” is based on beliefs and practices of the institution of medicine. The underlying ideology identifies the problem as “illness” carried by the “patient,” the technology chosen based on scientific, objective, and rational analysis, i.e., diagnosis, and the solution as “cure” (Freidson, 1970; Larson, 1977). The diagnostic category in turn informs the nature of inquiry, inference and treatment (Abbott, 1988). The doctor has authority and control; each staff member has their precise role to follow. “This authority comes with a strong endorsement of hierarchy and at the expense of a more interdisciplinary approach” (Meyerson, 1991a, p. 138).

The “community model,” which derives from a “psychosocial model,” in contrast, identifies the problem in a broader frame to include the social, economic, and ethnic context, the technology is focused more on the process, which is both subjective and affective, and the solution is adjustment and adaptation. This model “values egalitarianism and stresses the importance of interdisciplinary professional teams” (Meyerson, 1991a, p. 139). The “client” is also encouraged to take control and share in the responsibility of treatment. The “community model” promotes comprehensiveness, continuity, prevention as well as rehabilitation (primary and tertiary treatment), and the importance of social support networks, both at the individual and organizational level (Hasenfeld, 1986). Community mental health centers (CMHCs) became one of the settings in which these conflicting ideologies met head to head and where the consequences became apparent.

Community Mental Health Centers (CMHC)

CMHCs were created by federal mandate (Community Mental Centers Health Act 1960) with the mission to provide treatment services to those in need (regardless of ability to pay). The goals of effective treatment (clinical goals) with an efficient use of resources (administrative goals) meant providing the required range of services with the appropriate staffing patterns. Treatment units were created to provide either a specific service (e.g., emergency intervention), or to provide service to a targeted population (e.g., the elderly, children, chronic psychiatric), within a particular geographic (catchment) area (as specified by the Mental Health Systems Act). Federal funding was contingent upon providing this range of services.

Guidelines for the nature of services provided and who would provide them were prescribed and monitored by regulatory agencies at the federal,

state, and city levels (from 40 to 160 separate agencies according to Kinzer, 1977).⁴ Continued funding and legitimacy depended on compliance with these agencies' guidelines. There were, however, conflicting interests and ideologies among them as well as among other major stakeholders who provided legitimacy for these centers, such as the community advisory boards who represented the interests of those being served and the professional associations who represented the interests of those providing the services. For example, the poor, minorities, and the chronically ill who may require different treatment modalities than those provided by the medical model, e.g., medication or psychotherapy, may not return for treatment, or are often screened out, considered unattractive because they don't respond. This results in lost revenues and lost legitimacy from the community (client) base. On the other hand, adherence to the "community model" may result in lost revenue and legitimacy from other funding and accrediting agencies because some of the services (e.g., activity therapy) and those provided by paraprofessionals are non-reimbursable, or because certain professional associations, such as AMA (medical association), consider that these services are not "really treatment."

Nevertheless, CMHCs were mandated to design treatment units that would provide *effective* mental health care to the population in need while *efficiently* utilizing mental health professionals and paraprofessionals, despite the limited resources available and affordable, and despite the diversity of specialization (discipline), training, and experience. Often, the range of services provided were constrained by the professional training of available staff. The task of the CMHC is further complicated not only by its dependency on these fragmented resources and the diffused responsibility for funding, but also by the diverse nature of the client population, the uncertain nature of the technologies and activities required, and the overriding problem of defining "mental health" and thus establishing the goals and criteria for evaluation. Under these conditions, ideology provides the rationale and justification for staff activities (Hasenfeld, 1986; Meyer, 1986). Furthermore, the ideology of the community mental health centers (psychosocial or community model) was often at odds with the local, already well-established providers (medical model).

Thus, the supposed rationality of this task is clouded by the ambiguity in determining what is effective treatment and the uncertainty in determining

⁴The Joint Commission of Hospital Accreditation (JCAH); Health Service Agency (HSA) federal; Medicaid/Medicare (national insurance); Office of Mental Hygiene (OMH) city; Department of Mental Health (DMH) city; Health and Hospital Corporation (HHC) city; professional associations, e.g., American Medical Association (AMA); etc.

how to attain it. These conditions encouraged the conflicting ideologies, i.e., different ruling myths indigenous to their institutional environment, to emerge and join in battle to determine appropriate design and staff utilization. The war once waged, the casualties often became the staff and patients. The next section will compare and contrast the two models in terms of organizational design and the consequences for behavior.

ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN

The organization design and the staffing patterns chosen are strongly influenced by the ruling myths underlying the models of mental health care. The "medical model," with its emphasis on the authority of the doctor (M.D.) and scientific thinking, tends to encourage mechanistic structures that are hierarchical, centralized, with specialized roles and tasks (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Freidson, 1970), and staffing patterns that tend to be "top heavy" (largely professional). The "community model," which emphasizes adaptation and subjective experience, tends to encourage more organic structures that are less hierarchical, more decentralized, with generalized roles and tasks, and with staffing patterns that tend to be "bottom heavy" (greater use of paraprofessionals) (Fisher, Mehr & Truckenbrod, 1974). Thus the medical and community models of mental health care differ in the degree to which decision making is centralized or decentralized and the degree to which tasks are specialized or generalized.

Centralization vs. Decentralization

In the medical model, authority and responsibility tend to be centralized and can be far removed from the "front lines." Decisions are passed down and desired actions (whether from the top or bottom) may require long lag time for implementation. Different departments, or functions, supervise and control the activities of their members assigned to the treatment units. In the case of one psychiatric inpatient unit, simple requests by patients for leave or off-ward passes had to be referred several levels up the hierarchy as they required, at minimum, a signed physician's order. In another (albeit extreme) case, a request to medicate a patient who refused treatment had to be referred from ward staff to ward psychiatrist to unit chief to clinical director to state regional office. This type of structure led to staff feeling helpless and frustrated. Given little room for initiative, the staff began to withdraw, expressing anger through passivity (leading to underproductivity), blaming the system (abdicating responsibil-

ity), stress, and burnout (Prince, 1980). At worst, it has led to physical violence, e.g., cases of patient or staff abuse.

In the community model, authority and responsibility tend to be more decentralized. Treatment units are structured according to program, geographic catchment area, or specialized service. Decision making is delegated to the unit chief who serves as a team leader, directing and coordinating the activities of many disciplines that have been assigned to that unit. Departments, such as nursing or social work, have less direct control over the activities performed. More responsibility for patient care may be delegated to the non-medical staff (e.g., psychologists, social workers, nurses aides).

Although this trend may have been initially the result of psychiatric manpower shortages in some of the public sector facilities, the delegation of responsibility also evolved from the changing conceptualization at the community level of the role of the patient vis-a-vis the doctor. Rather than being "taken care of," the patient was seen as a responsible party in deciding the treatment approach. In the context of deinstitutionalization this meant that the patient became a community member and needed to develop skills in assuming this new role (see Goffman, 1961 for a vivid description of the reverse process of institutionalization). These demands enhanced the role of the non-medical staff as it was no longer "the doctor" who was omniscient and omnipotent. This approach encouraged the development of therapeutic communities or "milieu" (Jones, 1953), wherein members from several disciplines participate in designing and delivering mental health services and patients also engage in designing their treatment program. This mutual involvement can develop resources and promote problem solving and coping abilities, in contrast with the medical model which often placed the staff as well as the patient in a passive role.

Specialization vs. Generalization

In the medical model, roles and tasks are relatively well defined and highly specialized. The medical doctor makes the decisions regarding patient treatment including auxiliary services required which are then contracted through departments. Departments, such as nursing or social work, serve in advisory roles or provide expertise and assign and evaluate tasks performed. For example, on one psychiatric inpatient unit, the attending psychiatrist writes the orders to be followed by the nursing staff. Activity therapists keep patients busy, while the social workers plan discharge and arrange welfare and out-patient follow up. Another psychiatrist performs direct clinical activities and then reports to the unit's medical

director. This can result in fragmentation of services due to lack of coordination and communication.

In the community model, roles and tasks are assigned more broadly according to interest or in line with the sharing of responsibility. While the psychiatrist role remains specialized, e.g., prescribing medication, and may even become more circumscribed, other roles become more generalized. It may be difficult to see the difference between the role of the psychologist, social worker, nurse, and “therapy aides” as they take on “treatment” case responsibilities.⁵ For example, while all patients on the unit may need psychiatric evaluation and medication (at least for legal responsibility or reimbursement), they may not need a psychiatrist for treatment purposes. The multidisciplinary staff can then negotiate task responsibility based on education and training (e.g., R.N., M.S.W.), prior experience, expedience, and desire (Strauss, 1985).

Thus, the degree of involvement of different disciplines in treatment can be viewed along a continuum wherein each discipline performs its tasks independently, as in a group private practice or consultation model with treatment coordinated at a higher level, or interdependently, as a team wherein treatment is coordinated at the level delivered. In the latter model, a multidisciplinary team emerges that can be highly interactive, participative in decision making and assigned tasks based on interest and experience as well as by training. According to Meyerson (1991a), the community model favors this interdisciplinary approach wherein team members participate in designing and delivering mental health services.

The advantages of the interdisciplinary team are those that evolve from participation in decision making; it can improve program and treatment quality by bringing in a wide range of technical expertise. This expertise develops resources and abilities advantageous to both staff and patients generating greater commitment to program and treatment, facilitating implementation, enhancing motivation and morale, and reducing absenteeism and turnover (Steers & Porter, 1974). High levels of morale, motivation and innovation can in turn create effective team functioning and program design — more so than the specific program details (Gaston, 1980).

In summary, the medical model tends to encourage organizational design wherein decision making is centralized and tasks are specialized. This design can result in cumbersome decision processes, passivity on the part of patients and staff, and fragmented treatment approach. The community

⁵At one point in time there was a discussion at the state level that all employees would have the job classification “mental health worker” differentiated only by grade level, and would no longer be identified by professional group.

model tends to encourage decentralized decision making and tasks being more generalized. While this can provide more challenge and team work, it may also cause diffused authority and responsibility, role confusion, and incongruence between job demands and abilities. Consequences of these aspects of design on motivation — professional identity, morale, and behavior — are further discussed in the next section.

MOTIVATIONAL CONSEQUENCES

Differences in centralization and specialization raise concerns about authority and responsibility, and ultimately professional identity.⁶ As the authority of the psychiatrist is threatened in the community model, alarms are set off in the medical establishment regarding the quality of services provided and the professional qualifications of those providing them. The community model is viewed as a deprofessionalization of mental health care: as a shift from clinical to social goals; and as “retrograde” — a system of custodial care combined with patchwork crisis support (Fink & Weinstein, 1979). Medical doctors are accused of abdicating responsibility and are encouraged to regain control by assuming *all* responsibility for patient evaluation, treatment, and program delivery (Freedman, 1979; Berlin, Kales, Humphrey, & Kales, 1981).

This represents the reaction when a profession, no longer in sole possession of technique, loses its basis for market control (Giddens, 1979). According to Van Maanen and Barley (1984, pp. 333, 335).

Occupational communities promote self-serving interpretations of the nature and relevance of their work in the organization as a means of generating control over that work. . . . When occupational communities are nested within heteronomous organizations, it is generally more difficult for local membership to maintain occupational standards of work and also more difficult for the membership to prevent non-occupational members from performing work which lies within the occupation's traditional domain.

As psychiatric services may not necessarily be those of a psychiatrist, the role and professional identity of the psychiatrist is called into question. Psychiatrists in the community model often serve in a consulting role, providing

⁶Professional domains are carefully protected and hotly contested turf. Professions are defined broadly as expertise or knowledge systems (Freidson, 1986). These knowledge systems shape the way human institutions are organized (Foucault, 1972), re-define problems, tasks, and the meaning of work, and shape self-concepts (Van Maanen & Barley, 1984). However, professional power is not just a function of knowledge but also of economic, political, and bureaucratic interest. Therefore, professions need to be understood in the broader social and economic, as well as historical and national context. They must also be studied in their evolution and in terms of the interrelationships among professions (e.g., psychiatry, neurology, psychology, and social work; see Abbott, 1988).

psychiatric evaluation (diagnosis) and prescription (medication), giving up direct authority while retaining legal responsibility for patients. The role of a psychiatrist as therapist or administrator can be delegated to non-medical staff. Most cases assigned to psychiatrists in CMHCs are those needing prescriptions, hospitalization, or medical referrals, while "talk therapy" can be assigned to others. Freidson (1986, p. 178) refers to this as being "technically autonomous while becoming organizationally impotent." As a result, psychiatrists often leave these settings for those more congruent with their professional identity (Stern & Hoover, 1980; Vasile & Gutheil, 1979).

In the community model, problems created by role blurring and task confusion may result in loss of professional identity and esteem, and anxiety and stress. Professional workers feel that they are not being well utilized, making them feel less effective. This creates a sense of loss of professional identity and the sense that opportunities for professional growth and development are inadequate. Stress reactions may occur due to a sense of loss of control over what is considered to be one's professional domain (Freidson, 1986). The lack of congruence between self- and job expectations may result in less satisfaction and commitment, low morale, and, eventually, high turnover (Katz & Kahn, 1978).

Non-professional workers may also object to this approach for although jobs may be more challenging and provide opportunity for growth, certain job assignments are considered undesirable and salaries are not equitable. Also, stress reactions can occur when interests do not match ability. On the other hand, stress may also be used by certain occupational groups to gain legitimacy as job stress conveys symbolic virtues of an occupation not recognized yet as a profession (Van Maanen & Barley, 1984). The experience of stress in itself, however, can be a function of ideology. In the medical model, stress is considered to be an illness and therefore may not be experienced or admitted, whereas in the psychosocial model, stress is considered to be a normal reaction to difficult situations and will be more readily acknowledged (Meyerson, 1991b).

Nevertheless, as the nature of the task itself is ambiguous and the nature of the treatment population can be anxiety provoking, structures may be put in place that better serve to manage staff anxiety than patient needs. For example, faced with the stress of high patient mortality rates in intensive care units, nursing staff chose to perform specialized tasks across all patients rather than assume nursing responsibility for a particular patient (Menzies, 1960). Furthermore, stress can also stimulate regressive tendencies. Unconscious fantasies about the purpose of the task and the defense mechanisms employed to regulate anxiety generated by those fantasies can also interfere with task performance (Bion, 1961). For example,

in the medical model, the “Doctor” may be seen as omnipotent and omniscient and the covert task of the staff group becomes having their dependency needs met, to be taken care of, rather than to take care of the patients. This is particularly true in this case as the patient group is very demanding and very dependent which evokes and stimulates these unconscious needs in the staff. Boundaries between staff members, patients and staff, overt and covert tasks, and administrative and therapeutic goals are often confused resulting in decreased organizational effectiveness (Prince, 1980).

Problems establishing boundaries can be seen as well in the broader context (Schneider, 1987). Role and task confusion at higher levels in the management hierarchy—confused lines of reporting, communication breakdown, and conflicting task priorities—will be reflected at the unit level. For example, consider the dilemma of the mandates to keep census up (number of beds filled) and to reduce length of stay as well as recidivism rates. This reflects conflict between the clinical goals determined by the professional staff (patient care) and the administrative goals determined by the managerial staff (cost control). Therefore, problems of role and task boundaries are not only the result of generalizing and democratizing service but may result from micro (group process) issues, i.e., the result of unconscious group dynamics that mitigate against job performance, as well as macro (larger systems) issues.

Furthermore, mental health organizations are systems within systems that reflect the interests of the nation state, professional associations, and public vs. private sector (Scott, 1986). “Guild wars” have led to court battles to determine who has the right to provide mental health care (Freidson, 1986; Abbott, 1988). In some states in the U.S., psychologists and social workers have won the right to third party reimbursement, i.e., insurance companies recognition that they can provide and direct treatment. Thus professional associations in protecting the interests (economic as well as professional identity) of their members contribute to the conflicting ideologies within the institutional environment. These professional rivalries and animosities are then played out within CMHCs contributing to poor morale, constricted communication between disciplines, and an emphasis on power rather than purpose.

Alternative Approaches

In response to conflicting ideologies, CMHCs have a heavy administrative task in managing both the centrifugal forces from the inside and the centripetal forces from the outside. According to Meyer (1986), the

uncertain and multiple sources of funding, highly permeable boundaries, unclear institutional rules, lack of consensual definition of the problem or the solution (goals or technologies) result in mental health organizations that are as loosely coupled, with weak and multiple systems of authority and responsibility, weak coordination and control, and a diffuse network of internal and external linkages. As a result, the system is perceived to be unstable, disorganized, and in crisis.

Some of the prescriptions that have been proposed are: to develop consensual definitions, develop niches (e.g., the chronically ill), to contract out services to the private sector, to simplify structure by becoming more bureaucratic, and to rationalize technology by focusing on medication and custodial care. This in turn would require fewer professionals. These recommendations are supposed to result in a "more efficient and more just" system of health care delivery (see Scott & Black, 1986; Hasenfeld, 1986). The next step would appear to be a return to the state hospital system and model of custodial care, when, in fact, alternative approaches have been shown to be effective both in terms of treatment and cost (Kiesler et al., 1983).

An alternative model is proposed wherein a network of treatment units is created in which different units report to or are dependent upon resources from different agencies but where the responsibility for coordination is assigned to a supraordinate level as interdependencies must be constantly negotiated. The structure of the CMHCs, conceived of in this manner, can be compared with that of a holding company or conglomerate (Hasenfeld, 1986).

Rather than an environment with a clearly defined hierarchy of institutional pressures, a market of competing myths would be established (D'Aunno & Price, 1988). In this model, units would choose among competing sources of funding depending on the nature of services to be provided, and as consistent with the particular set of beliefs in order to ensure legitimacy, resources and survival (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). This is possible as different actors create different pressures for conformity: state — coercive pressures through legislation; and professional associations — mimetic and normative pressures via training and socialization practices and codes of ethics (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1986). Thus the structural features of each unit would be determined by the nature of the service provided: the clinical goal and the corresponding technologies to achieve that goal, as shown in Table I.

For example, in psychiatric emergency rooms the goal is to provide accurate and timely evaluation and treatment in order to protect patient from self (suicidal) or others (homicidal). Here physical or chemical restraint may be warranted for control and referral to inpatient or outpatient

Table I. Matching Goals, Technologies and Structures Across Psychiatric Services (Units)

Goals	Technologies	Structures	Unit
Protect from self and others	Restraints/commitment	Centralized/hierarchical specialized	Emergency room
Reduce acute symptomatology	Medication/supervision	Centralized/team specialized	Acute inpatient service
Resolve residual symptomatology; return to community	Medication/psychotherapy short-term rehabilitation	Centralized/team generalist	Day hospital
Restore or develop skills	Activities/occupational and vocational therapy rehabilitation	Decentralized/team generalist	Day treatment (psychosocial rehabilitation)
Maintenance	Medication/psychotherapy	Decentralized/specialized	Outpatient clinic

services as indicated. Often, social support systems have failed and patients can be maintained in the community if appropriate resources are deployed. These services are often made under pressure of limited time and often require staff to perform specific tasks (i.e., medicate, restrain, find resources, housing, or outpatient care). In this situation, decision making needs to be centralized while roles are hierarchical and specialized in order to respond in a timely fashion as well as to provide the concrete services (e.g., medication or housing) needed. Thus the medical model is more congruent with the treatment goals in this unit. In fact, private, medical, acute care facilities have been developed in the community (in shopping malls) which has eased the pressures on public hospital emergency rooms.

If the goal of treatment is then to reduce acute symptomatology, referral is made to an acute inpatient service wherein medication, continued evaluation, supportive psychotherapy, and supervision are provided. These goals and technologies require a design which is centralized and in which roles remain fairly specialized, but where there is more of a team approach as several staff members interact with the same patient. The centralized and specialized design in part derives from pressures for cost containment which have led to the administrative goal to reduce the length of stay to three weeks, therefore treatment tasks need to be specialized but coordinated. These units can also be free standing clinics (as in the French model, see Kimberley and Kervasdoué, 1979) which provide only inpatient care.

Subsequent referral to day hospital programs are made to resolve residual symptomatology and to prepare patients to return to the community requiring technologies of medication, brief problem-focused psychotherapy and skill building through activities and training, i.e., short-term rehabilitation as these programs are also often limited to 3 months for similar reasons to those stated above. Here the design can become less centralized and the team approach more generalized as the patient should begin to assume more and more responsibility in treatment planning. Participation of staff and patients is crucial in developing resources and, in fact, allows for the practice and development of problem solving and coping behaviors. Using a team rather than hierarchical approach facilitates the coordination of services.

Day treatment programs provide psychosocial rehabilitation to restore or to develop skills in the more chronically ill patients. Here the treatment technologies are primarily activities of a social and occupational/vocational nature to enable patients to remain in the community. Here a decentralized, team approach with role generalization can be used with referral for specific treatment as indicated (e.g., medication). Finally, outpatient clinics

can be decentralized and specialized, operating in a group private practice model, providing medication and psychotherapy given the goal of maintenance and improved functioning.

Different units have different goals that make them more or less amenable to different models. Some degree of participation by both staff and patients in treatment planning and implementation is thought to improve morale and commitment. Rather than an either/or approach of medical or community models, perhaps interdisciplinary teams can be used but modified to fit the goals and technologies required by that treatment unit. The extent of participation in decision making, for example, can vary from group consensus to autocratic depending on the structure of the problem, the information available, nature of the decision to be made, and the climate of the unit (Vroom & Jago, 1974).

This model is admittedly too rational as it does not account for power and political dimensions that drive the ideologies underlying the community and medical models of mental health care. According to Abbott (1988), professions are based on dominance and autonomy not on collegiality and trust; they represent market organizations that attempt intellectual and organizational domination of arenas of social concerns via the social handling of illness or the medicalization of social problems, e.g., alcoholism. The power of professionals to act as gatekeepers of desirable goods and services, and the formal knowledge selected for use, however, is constrained by power, interests, and knowledge of clients served (Friedson, 1970, 1986; Larson, 1977). Therefore, by creating a market for ideologies, units can be created wherein the structure and staffing patterns can reflect the ideology of the dominant coalition. Power and politics then can be played out externally rather than internally in having to obtain the necessary resources and client base.

CONCLUSION

Social service and welfare organizations seem to have grown indiscriminately with little or no thought given to planning for effective and efficient service delivery (Wortman, 1983). Providing effective and efficient mental health care is further constrained by unique product/market characteristics: intangible, hard to measure service and outcome; multiple service objectives; weak customer influence; employee commitment to professional groups rather than organizations; and intrusion of resource contributors (funding agencies) (Newman & Wallender, 1978). Furthermore, given that goals may be poorly defined and the technologies are often less than precise, it is difficult to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages

of one design over another. Thus ideologies come to play an important role as what is believed overrides what can(not) be proved.

Institutions, their structure and ideology, have a profound effect on the role of the inmates, both patients and staff (Goffman, 1961). There are serious consequences in terms of personal/professional identity and competence, responsibility and accountability, satisfaction and motivation. What is at stake is the fate of mental health patients and the "burnout" of mental health personnel (Cherniss, 1980).

To what extent do conflicting ideologies contribute to the problem and to what extent can their coexistence contribute to the solution? The hope of balancing autonomy and responsibility, leadership and decision making, with competence remains a utopian vision given the institutional cross pressures. But if utopia were to be created, what would it look like? Is there some way in which the different ideologies underlying the different models can coexist or are they necessarily mutually exclusive? Is there some way in which their coexistence can produce a creative, constructive tension so that treatment units can be designed that maximize treatment effectiveness, while maximizing the utilization of staff, thus achieving both clinical and administrative goals? Could we go so far as to hope that this dialectic, the coexistence of competing ideologies, could bring about radical innovation in mental health care delivery? These are the questions that still need to be addressed.

According to Bartunek (1984), changes of interpretive schema and the way these schema are linked to structure depends on comparative power. The extent to which expectation of shared understandings are necessary for interpretive schema to be integrally linked to structure depends upon occupational identity being more salient than organizational identity, and differences in subgroups' interpretive schema being taken as a matter of course. What is needed is to be able to optimize each staff member's potential contribution without minimizing another's; to balance generalist and specialist models without losing professional identity and esteem; and to reduce role conflict and ambiguity without becoming constricted by role rigidity and bureaucratic red tape. Differences in ideologies must be acknowledged but utilized in such a way as to help each party to better recognize the potential contribution of the other and to establish a credible basis where tasks and roles can be negotiated.

Yet perhaps these questions are too much in keeping within the established order, i.e., first order change (Watzlawick, Weakland, & Fisch, 1974; Bartunek, 1984). Social experiments such as Ghel in Belgium and closing of state mental hospitals in Italy (Mosher, 1982) were precursors to the deinstitutionalization movement in the U.S. Although started in the

U.S. in the 1960s, its impact is clearly visible in the streets today almost 30 years later. The problem of the homeless is in part its legacy.

Perhaps it is time to imagine another system or ideology of mental health care delivery. For example, self-help models, such as Alcoholics Anonymous or drug treatment facilities reject both the community and medical models, and rely more on peers than professionals or paraprofessionals. These approaches represent one effort to re-define the frame and change the system. This approach has not yet been "institutionalized" within the mental health care system.

Reframing the notion of illness and the role of the patient has had interesting impact at the individual treatment level (Haley, 1977; Laing & Esterson, 1964) although has not been extended to the broader systems (service delivery) level. This would involve questions such as: What role does the chronic psychiatric population play in defining the larger system of mental health care delivery?; What do they contribute to the ideology of "mental health"?; To what extent do they represent the repository for all of our concerns about abilities to cope in an ever-changing world, where stress has become a major part of everyday experience and vocabulary? (Barley & Knight, 1991).

Perhaps an unintended example is to be found in the movie "The King of Hearts." In the face of imminent Nazi occupation during World War II, the local inhabitants of the town flee, leaving open the door to the mental asylum. The inmates, uninformed of the circumstances, begin gradually to move into the town, assume the roles of the local inhabitants, and live "normally" ever after. One wonders if the institutionalized policies and practices of the "real world" today are not in part responsible for creating the very pathologies they are trying to cure. Perhaps there is a fine line between ideology and delusion.

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The Partial Unacceptability of Money in Repayment for Neighborly Help

Paul Webley¹ and Stephen E. G. Lea^{1,2}

This study focuses on the acceptability of using money in repayment for three kinds of neighborly help. Questionnaires were distributed to 400 households in four different neighborhoods. Only in the case of the "loan" of food was money found to be an acceptable form of repayment. In most cases, the use of money was rejected because it would break a social convention. There was a strong preference for repaying help by offering the same kind of help in exchange. The data suggested that there are strong patterns of reciprocal helping. Multiple regression analyses showed that the amount of help received was correlated with age, place of previous residence, and the number of people in the immediate area whom the respondent would call by name. Respondents who scored higher on either help received or perceived neighborliness were slightly more willing to offer money in repayment of neighborly help. These results are consistent with the view that there are limits on the use of money in social exchanges.

KEY WORDS: neighbor; helping behavior; money; reciprocity.

INTRODUCTION

According to Campbell and Lee (1990) "a rich literature examines interactions between neighbors." Neighborhoods and neighborliness have indeed preoccupied sociologists as far back as the turn of the century, when neighborhood was given a conceptual status comparable to the family and social class (Olson, 1982). So it is reasonable to ask what economic psychologists are doing invading this well-known territory.

In fact, although there has been research on neighborhoods for many decades, the main focus has been on attachment to and involvement with the neighborhood and the level of analysis has been meso rather

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than micro. Most analyses have attempted to account for variations in neighborliness and there has been little interest in the rules that govern exchanges between neighbors in Western cultures. It is this topic that concerns us here.

We are particularly interested in the role that money plays in such exchanges. Money is usually characterized by economists as a universal medium of exchange, but it has become clear from research in economic psychology that some of its properties place limits on its use. In a typical demonstration of this effect Webley, Lea, and Portalska (1983) showed that money was unacceptable as a gift from young adults to their mothers and that to compensate for its unacceptability roughly twice as much would be given in money as spent on a present. Later research (e.g., Webley & Wilson, 1989; Pieters & Robben, 1992) has extended this work, and although it has demonstrated that in certain contexts (e.g., from givers of higher to lower status) money is acceptable as a gift, the finding that money is not universally acceptable remains secure.

These empirical results fit well with the broader perspectives on money taken by Zelizer (1989) and Belk and Wallendorf (1990). Zelizer elaborates a model of "special monies" which are appropriate only for certain exchanges and as an example shows how domestic money ("pin money") was confined to particular uses in the early twentieth century. Exchanges which must be non-monetary, such as certain gift-exchanges, can simply be seen as an extreme case of "special money." Belk and Wallendorf (1990) have made a related distinction between the sacred and profane meanings of money. In a profane exchange, an individual is concerned with getting good value for money and price is important. By contrast, in sacred exchanges, which are set aside from everyday experiences, price is not a factor. Belk, Wallendorf and Sherry (1990) claim that gifts and the home are regarded as existing in the realm of the sacred by many consumers and so it is likely that neighborly exchange will fall in the sacred domain.

Conceptual frameworks that are concerned with social exchange are also helpful. According to the resource theory of Foa and Foa (1980), a gift of money to a family member corresponds to attempting to exchange money for love, and because these are members of very different resource classes the exchange involves considerable strain. The distinction between exchange and communal relationships made by Clarke and Mills (Clarke & Mills, 1979; Mills & Clarke, 1982) is also useful as it is the rules governing the exchange of benefits that most clearly differentiate these two kinds of relationship. Communal relationships are characterized by an implicit agreement to take care of one another's needs or what one could call a norm of mutual responsiveness. Thus, people in such relationships

should avoid exact or hasty reciprocation as this might indicate repayment and thus a preference for an exchange relationship. In exchange relationships, on the other hand, people give in the expectation that they will receive, repay quickly and keep careful track of their obligations. From this perspective, a gift of money to a friend or relative would be risky as it would suggest that the friendship is governed by the norm of exact reciprocity and not that of mutual responsiveness.

In discussing limitations on the use of money, Lea, Tarpy, and Webley (1987, Chap. 12) commented that it would be inappropriate to give a neighbor money if he or she helped with some chore or lent some food or garden tool. This is plausible but it is likely that the real picture is considerably more complex. The research reported in this paper attempts to put this intuition on a proper empirical footing. To do so, however, requires us to take account of the existing sociological research on neighborhoods, alluded to above. Although such research has been little concerned with social and economic exchange, it does enable us to describe the context in which this takes place. It also suggests possible confounding factors that will need to be taken into account in trying to test our hypothesis that money will not be acceptable in repayment for neighborly help. Two lines of research are particularly useful in these respects.

The first is that concerned with differentiating types of neighborhoods. Various typologies have been proposed. Warren (1978), for example, suggested a seven-fold classification including such neighborhoods as the "integral" (cohesive with ties to the wider community), "parochial" (cohesive with few ties to the wider community) and the "transitory" (where residents generally do not identify with the neighborhood). The residents of these types of neighborhoods differed sharply in the percentage who used neighborly aid, with only 37% doing so in the transitory neighborhood compared to 58% in the parochial. This alerts us to the possibility that the social rules regulating exchanges may differ between neighborhoods and the need to sample a variety of neighborhoods.

A second important area of neighborhood research is concerned with variations in neighborliness. There is a consensus that the two most important characteristics that increase opportunity for contact with neighbors (and are thus associated with greater neighborliness) are the length of residence in a neighborhood and the presence of children in a household (Fisher, 1984; Robinson & Abrams, 1977; Unger & Wandersman, 1982). Age is also associated with neighborliness though there is some dispute about the exact nature of the relationship. Robinson and Abrams (1977) favor the view that relationship is U-shaped, with the young and the old having the most neighborly contact. A final important characteristic is social class. The usual finding is that contact with neighbors is

higher in working class districts but this was not found in England in the Buxton study (Kingston Polytechnic, 1972).

The most relevant previous research is that of Korte (1988), who was interested in the problem of increasing neighborly help. As part of his study he tried to identify the social and individual characteristics of residents who showed higher levels of help exchange. They turned out to be better educated and to be more involved in neighborhood activities. Help exchange was highest in the 36–50 age group and decreased thereafter. Higher levels of help exchange were associated with a perception that neighbors had things in common with oneself and with shorter lengths of residence in the neighborhood. This latter finding is unusual and Korte suggests that help exchange is being used by the new residents in his study as a strategy for integrating into the community. However, it should be noted that Korte's age profile of helpfulness is also the direct opposite of what Robinson and Abrams report, so it may be that his study involved an unusual study site or procedure.

Korte comments that the profile of the "high help resident" may well differ according to the type of neighborhood which again emphasizes the need to look at neighborly exchange in a variety of neighborhoods and, more generally, in a variety of cultures. In carrying out the present research, therefore, we did not follow any preconceived notion of which residents would be most helpful to their neighbors, but we did try to measure both overall neighborliness and some of the factors that might underlie it. Within either the Belk/Zelizer conception of the uses of money, or the Foas/Clarke and Mills view of social exchange, it seems likely that more neighborly individuals, or individuals in more neighborly neighborhoods, might be less comfortable offering money in return for help than those with more impersonal relations.

METHOD

Questionnaire

The questionnaire included questions about the acceptability of using money as a repayment of three kinds of neighborly help: the "loan" of food when the shops are shut, the loan of a tool, and help with a larger do-it-yourself job on house, car, or garden. For the latter two kinds of help, questions were asked about the kind of repayment people would make if they would not offer money. The response categories suggested were not identical in the two cases, as our intuitions about what responses were likely differed. For the case of help with larger jobs, a question was asked about exceptional circumstances in which help might be paid for.

In addition, questions were asked about the respondents' experience of various kinds of neighborly help, how long they had lived in the neighborhood and where they had lived before, and their general feelings about the neighborhood. A questionnaire was appropriate as the questions asked were very straightforward and were in no way intrusive or concerned with sensitive issues.

The questions were distributed as a four-page questionnaire, accompanied by a letter inviting recipients to participate which explained that we were trying to find out how people in Britain today behave toward their neighbors, a reply-paid envelope for returning the questionnaire, and a reply-paid postcard for requesting information about the results of the study.

Participants and Procedure

Questionnaires were distributed in four neighborhoods within Exeter, chosen on the basis of our knowledge of the city as local residents. Exeter is a medium-sized provincial English city (population approximately 100,000) with a very small proportion of ethnic minorities. Neighborhood A was a long-established residential area near the city center, with housing dating from the late nineteenth century. Originally working class, it now has a considerable middle class population with some student and other temporary accommodation. Neighborhood B was a working-class housing estate dating from the 1930s, with mainly rented accommodation but some owner occupation. Neighborhood C was the oldest part of a more recently developed, mainly middle-class, almost exclusively owner-occupied estate, dating from the 1960s. Neighborhood D was the most recently developed part of a more sought-after middle-class residential area, with smaller but almost entirely owner-occupied properties dating from the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1981 census, owner occupation levels recorded for the enumeration districts within which the sampled areas lay were 61% for neighborhood A, 30% for B, and 99% for C; census data for neighborhood D were unusable because enumeration district boundaries did not enclose coherent social units.

Within each neighborhood questionnaires were distributed, one to every fourth house until 100 had been delivered. Different colored questionnaires were used in each neighborhood. Participants were told in the accompanying letter that the questionnaires were completely anonymous.

Questionnaires were date-stamped when they were returned. When the results were coded, all additional comments written in by respondents were copied and collated. One month after the distribution of the questionnaires,

a letter was sent to all participants who had returned the postcard, thanking them for their help and informing them of the main results of the study, so far as they were then known.

RESULTS

The number of questionnaires received before the feedback letter was sent out was 187 (47%). Of these, 42 came from neighborhood A, 34 from B, 54 from C, and 57 from D. Most questionnaires were filled in completely, but percentages reported below take account of missing data where necessary. In some cases, respondents ticked more than one answer, and wherever possible, both answers were coded, so percentages given below may add to more than 100% for some questions.

The respondents showed an excess of women (only 36% were male), but were reasonably representative of the adult population in respect of age: 19% reported that they were aged 30 or under, 45% between 31 and 50, 22% between 51 and 65, and 14% over 65. The distribution of days between questionnaire delivery and return of questionnaires was markedly bimodal, with 125 (67%) of returns occurring within 5 days or less and the remainder taking 7 days or more. Returns taking more than 6 days were therefore classified as "late" and used to estimate the probable characteristics of non-returns (cf. Oppenheim, 1966).

Most respondents (81%) would offer to pay for food they asked to "borrow"; however, 41% of this group (and 85% of those who said they would not offer money) thought that their neighbor would not actually accept money if it was offered. In contrast, few said that they would offer to pay for borrowing a tool (9%), or for help with a large do-it-yourself job (18%). Regression analysis showed that these probabilities were negligibly affected by age, gender, the neighborhood of residence, or whether the response arrived "late." Other means of repayment were much more popular. Few respondents would be content to do nothing (2% for the loan of a tool), or simply to thank a neighbor (3% for a larger job). Instead, for the loan of a tool, people preferred the idea of doing some small favor (29%), or, particularly, doing the same for their neighbor in the future (81%). For a bigger job, people again preferred to offer to do the same in return (46%), although buying a present for the helpful neighbor was even more popular (49%). Even for "borrowing" food, several respondents (some who said they would offer money and some who would not) commented that they would try to return the same kind of food.

The reasons given for not offering money were overwhelmingly to do with social convention. In the case of help with a large job, 44% said

that their neighbor would be offended by the offer; 43% that it just wouldn't be the way neighbors behave. Several comments written into the questionnaire elaborated on these conventions, e.g., "I know they would not want payment. We help each other in times of need." However, many respondents recognized that these conventions could be overridden in some circumstances; 18% said they would pay if asked, 25% if a very big job was involved, 46% if what the neighbor was doing was part of his or her job, and 51% if the neighbor concerned was unemployed or in special need of money for some other reason. Additional comments written in often suggested special circumstances in which payment might be appropriate.

Further evidence for a tendency to direct reciprocation came from the reports of the kinds of neighborly help people had given and received in their present residence. Not surprisingly, the number of kinds of help people had given and received were highly correlated (Pearson $r = 0.66$), but there are many confounding variables that could produce such a correlation. Accordingly, multiple regressions were run in which the dependent variable was, in turn, each kind of help given, and the independent variables were the five kinds of help received. In each case, the regression coefficients for all five kinds of help were positive (though not always significant), showing a general tendency for help of any kind to be reciprocated. More important, though, in each case, the coefficient for the corresponding kind of help was the largest of the five; so, regardless of the general tendency for helpfulness to be reciprocated, those who borrowed food were more likely to lend it, and so forth.

We tried to find out what factors go to make a neighborhood neighborly, both in practice and in our respondents' eyes. As an index of actual neighborliness, we took the total number of kinds of neighborly help (out of five) that the respondents reported receiving (though it could be argued that this defines the neediness of a neighborhood). As an index of perceived neighborliness, we took respondents' answers to the question "How neighborly do you think the area where you now live is?" For both actual and perceived neighborliness, best subsets regression was used to find the best prediction of respondents' own ratings of neighborliness, considering as possible determinants the length of time the respondent had lived at his or her present address, where they had moved there from, and the numbers of people they knew and would call by name, as well as the obvious demographic variables of age, sex, and neighborhood, and the methodological checking variable, lateness of return. Because of the results of Robinson and Abrams (1977), who found that neighborly contact was a U-shaped function of age, the age variable was examined before proceeding with the analysis. It was found that values for help received peaked in the middle

age range, an inverted-U function. For the regression analyses, therefore, age was broken down into dummy variables rather than being used as an ordinal variable. The modal age category, 31–50, was used as a reference category; since there was only one respondent under 18, his data were categorized with the 18–30 age group. The respondent's neighborhood was also handled by dummy variables, the neighborhood with most returns (D) being used as the reference value.

For the numbers of kinds of help received, the best fitting regression model accounted for 20.2% of variance (R^2_{adj}) and was highly significant ($F_{6,172} = 8.53, p < 0.0005$), as was the model including all regressors ($F_{12,161} = 4.26, p < 0.0005$). The best fitting model contained the following terms: length of residence (longer established residents had received more help, $p < 0.0005$), previous place of residence (those who had come from further away received more help), number of people in the street called by name (respondents who received more help called more people by name, $p < 0.0005$), and the age > 65 category (the oldest respondents received less help, $p < 0.05$). In addition, neighborhoods A and B differed from neighborhood D; residents in both received more help than residents in D, those in A significantly so ($p = 0.05$).

For perceived neighborliness, the same regressors were used, with the addition of the number of kinds of help given and received. The best fitting regression model accounted for 25.9% of variance (R^2_{adj}) and both it and the model including all regressors were again highly significant ($F_{7,169} = 9.78, F_{14,157} = 4.69, p < 0.0005$ in both cases). The best fitting model contained the following terms: length of residence (longer established residents gave lower ratings), number of people in the street known by name (those knowing more names gave higher ratings, $p < 0.0005$), age (respondents aged 51–65 or over 65 rated local neighborliness as higher, $p < 0.05$ in each case), and the number of kinds of help that had been received ($p < 0.01$). In addition, neighborhoods A and C were rated more neighborly than the reference neighborhood D, A significantly so ($p < 0.05$).

A simple measure of willingness to offer money for help was then constructed by taking the total number of "Yes" answers to the three direct questions about this. This score was then regressed against the scores of actual and perceived neighborliness derived above. The resulting relationship was weak ($R^2_{\text{adj}} = 2.8\%$) but significant ($F_{2,154} = 3.25, p < 0.05$), with both variables having small positive regression coefficients. Thus individuals who experience and perceive more neighborliness are (slightly) more rather than less likely to repay it with money. A corresponding measure of willingness of offer non-money repayment was constructed by taking the total number of non-money items ticked in the questions asking about

repayment for the loan of a tool or for help with a larger job. This measure was not significantly related to experienced and perceived neighborliness ($R^2_{\text{adj}} = 0.5\%$, $F_{2,161} = 1.45$, $p > 0.05$).

The lateness of return variable did not enter significantly into any of the relationships investigated.

DISCUSSION

The overall response rate of 47% was very satisfactory, and even in the least responsive neighborhood it was entirely acceptable (34%). The only obvious way in which the respondents were an unrepresentative sample was in the excess number of women filling in the questionnaire. It is probable that those who returned questionnaires represent the more helpful and neighborly among the population (Exeter is a small city and the university would generally be recognized as forming an integral part of it). But as there were no differences on any response variable between the early and late returns, it seems reasonable to accept the respondents as an adequately representative sample, at least of the four neighborhoods studied.

The results confirm our guess (Lea et al., 1987, Chap. 12) that money is not a universally acceptable means of exchange when it comes to repaying neighborly help. They do not confirm the strong form of that suggestion, that money is never acceptable in such situations; when consumable goods have changed hands, indeed, most people would offer money for them, though in many cases the offer seems to be a polite formality since it is not expected to be taken up. For services such as the loan of a tool or practical help, however, money is not an acceptable repayment unless there are special reasons why it should be given. We do not believe that there is anything special about the loan of food per se. It seems likely that it is the distinction between "borrowing" that involves consumption and "borrowing" that is a service that is crucial; we would predict that if a neighbor borrowed a sander and wore out a sanding disk, he would offer to replace it.

Why is money sometimes unacceptable? It is not because no repayment is required for neighborly help. On the contrary, the data bear witness to elaborate norms and networks for the repayment of help. But there seems to be a strong tendency for reciprocation both of neighborly help in general and of specific kinds of help: the best way of repaying a favor is with another favor of the same kind. For example, the kind of repayment most often chosen even for a large do-it-yourself job was "Offer to do the same for them in the future" (admittedly such offers might sometimes be rather theoretical), while for each kind of help people reported having

given, they were more likely also to have received it. One respondent wrote in, "A neighbours' help should be a friendly gesture on both sides: help should work both ways," and there were a number of similar comments. Returning the same kind of help as has been given avoids having to set an exact value on that help, whether in terms of money or of any other general standard. The precision of money payment, which means an exact value is set on an act of kindness, may well lie at the heart of its inappropriateness.

These results are consistent with the general view that some exchanges are too special to be conducted with general-purpose money (Zelizer, 1989), with the distinction between sacred and profane exchanges (Belk & Wallendorf, 1990), with the specific ideas about preferred patterns of exchange offered by Foa and Foa (1980) and with the characterization of communal relationships proposed by Clarke and Mills (1979).

As well as a taboo on the use of money in repayment for help, we also found some traces of a taboo (noted by Robinson & Abrams, 1977) on asking for help at all. One respondent, in answer to the question which asked her to think of the neighbor she would be most likely to ask for the loan of food, commented, "I would not dream of asking a neighbour for food. I would rather go without"; and at least seven other respondents wrote in similar comments.

Our data on actual and rated neighborliness also confirm some of the findings of sociological researchers. Although we found, like much previous research, that longer established residents received more help, this was probably an artifact of the way the question was posed, since those who had lived longer in their present home had had more opportunity to receive help. Perceived neighborliness actually declined with length of residence, as previously found by Korte (1988), though the effect was not significant. Like Kingston Polytechnic (1972), we found no obvious effect of social class (the two neighborhoods that would be seen as more working class were the most and the least neighborly). The effect of age was complex. Help received showed an inverted-U relationship with age, consistent with the data of Korte (1988) but the exact opposite of Robinson and Abrams' (1977) hypothesis, while perceived neighborliness increased monotonically with age. Unfortunately we did not ask our respondents how many children they had, but we did show that the number of neighbors whom people claimed to know by name or to call by their first name is an important indicator of neighborliness. These two variables were, not surprisingly, highly correlated (Pearson $r = 0.77$).

It should be noted that none of our regressions on actual or perceived neighborliness accounted for high proportions of the data, and some significant differences between neighborhoods remained even with all the supposed explanatory variables taken into account. So we cannot claim to have identified the essence of what makes a neighborhood neighborly. Furthermore, although the neighborliness variables did have a significant effect on people's willingness to use money to repay neighborly help, the effect was small and in the unexpected direction: more neighborly individuals were slightly more likely to use money. Perhaps they are more punctilious; or perhaps they are familiar enough with their neighbors to be less embarrassed at breaking what seems to be quite a strong social taboo.

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Learning, Trust, and Technological Collaboration

Mark Dodgson^{1,2}

Companies increasingly collaborate in their technological activities. Collaboration enables firms to learn about uncertain and turbulent technological change, and enhances their ability to deal with novelty. A number of studies reveal the importance for successful collaboration of high levels of inter-personal trust between scientists, engineers, and managers in the different partners. However, these individual relationships are vulnerable to labor turnover and inter-personal difficulties. Using two examples of highly successful technological collaborations, it is argued that the survival of such relationships in the face of these inevitable inter-personal problems requires the establishment of inter-organizational trust. Such trust is characterized by community of interest, organizational cultures receptive to external inputs, and widespread and continually supplemented knowledge among employees of the status and purpose of the collaboration.

KEY WORDS: learning; trust; technological collaboration.

INTRODUCTION

Companies in a wide range of industries, and of all sizes, are experiencing considerable uncertainty and flux engendered by the rapid changes taking place in their competitive and technological environments. New and pervasive technologies, such as information and communications technology, have already profoundly influenced industrial structures and organization within firms; and emerging technologies, such as biotechnology and advanced materials, have the potential to do the same. The turbulence and disruption facing industrial companies occurs in large part because individual firms in isolation cannot control these changes.

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The direction and pace of technological development depends on *inter-organizational* interactions: between firms and the science base of universities and research laboratories, and between firms in their relationships as competitors and collaborators, and users and suppliers of products, processes, and services. Technological change involves the need for an external orientation within firms to enable them to *learn* to detect and comprehend the extent of the *uncertainties* in their operating environment, and to begin to reduce them by accessing relevant and novel know-how.

There is a large and growing literature on these interorganizational linkages. Many studies of the process of collaboration refer to the necessity of high levels of trust between partner firms in order to facilitate communication and learning. Most of these studies, however, focus on *inter-personal* trust; the way in which close and respectful relationships between key managers, scientists, and engineers in the different partners encourages success. While this is undoubtedly crucial, this paper argues it is also important to examine *inter-organizational* trust. It contends that effective learning between partners depends on the construction of a “climate” of trust engrained in organizational modes of behavior, and supported by the belief in the mutual benefits of collaboration throughout the organization. Only when such inter-organizational trust exists can the partnership continue when inter-personal relationships break down, as they often can, through labor turnover or personality clashes between individuals.

TECHNOLOGICAL COLLABORATION IN INDUSTRY

There is a substantial literature on the extent, motives, and process of technological collaboration (see, for example, Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Mowery, 1988). Such linkages—which can range from formal joint ventures, strategic alliances, and joint R&D and production sharing projects to informal linkages between peers, and are known variously as “collaboration,” “co-operation,” and “networking”—are not a new phenomenon. However, it is argued that the new technologies are both a stimulus to, and focus for, increased collaborative behavior (Mytelka, 1991; Freeman, 1990).

Technological linkages occur with academia and research organizations, and with firms’ customers, suppliers, and competitors (the terms linkage and collaboration are here used synonymously). There are a wide range of explanations for the prevalence of these linkages (examined in Dodgson, forthcoming). Although collaboration occurs in many different forms and for very diverse motives, a number of generalizable assumptions

underpin collaborations in the sense used here. First is the belief that collaboration can lead to *positive sum gains* in internal activities. That is, partners can together obtain mutual benefits which they could not achieve independently. Benefits may include increased scale and scope of activities, reduced costs, greater speed, or improved ability to deal with complexity. The basis of this assumption lies in an expectation of a continuing close relationship based on reciprocity (Axelrod, 1984; Aoki, 1984).

Second, collaboration is believed to offer greater *flexibility* and *effectiveness* in comparison to its alternatives. So, for example, it may be an alternative to direct foreign investment by firms and to mergers and acquisitions which are less easily amended once entered into. It can facilitate the transfer of know-how—which frequently is tacit, and firm-specific—between organizations more effectively than can purely market transactions. Third, collaboration is believed to assist with *environmental uncertainty*. Increasingly sophisticated and demanding consumers, the growing competition in and internationalization of markets, and rapidly changing and disruptive technologies places pressures on firms to exist with, and attempt to control, these uncertainties confronting them. This is more easily achieved in collaboration than in isolation. Learning through collaboration is argued to be a response to this uncertainty (Lyles, 1988; Mody, 1990; Ciborra, 1991).

LEARNING IN FIRMS

A range of academic disciplines—such as economics, organization, innovation, and management studies—have addressed the ways firms cope with and benefit from change through “learning.” Organizational learning has been a central focus within the organization theory perspective (Argyris & Schon, 1978). Within an “innovation studies” perspective, learning is a central feature of macro-theorists such as Dosi (1988) at one level, new product development at another (Maidique & Zirger, 1985), and the manufacturing function at another (Hayes et al., 1988). Economists often make reference to learning in firms. Arrow (1962) refers to “learning-by-doing”: the way unit costs reduce over time or with experience, and (Adler, 1990) analyzes how learning in production transfers from one plant to another. Rosenberg (1982) refers to “learning-by-using”: the way firms improve performance by eliciting feedback on product and process performance.

Learning is also a feature within a management studies perspective. Concepts such as the “learning curve” are common currency, and the differential abilities of firms to learn about technology are suggested as reasons for the comparative success of some firms over others (Imai et al.,

1985). Learning is argued to be a complex concept, and in firms, Dodgson (1991a) argues that it is necessary to distinguish different aims, focus, nature, and processes of learning, and that it is particularly important to analyze ways in which learning is diffused throughout the firm.

It is the R&D departments of firms that provide a major source of learning, and the major vehicle for learning about new technological developments. Mowery (1981) argues that the development of formal R&D structures in firms was a response to the need to learn effectively about developing science and technology. However, learning from external sources is also an essential activity for firms concerned with technological competitiveness. External inputs are critical for successful innovation (Gibbons & Johnston, 1974; Rothwell et al., 1974). Industrial companies are believed increasingly to be developing external linkages with other organizations (Link & Tasse, 1987; van Tulder & Junne, 1988). Key reasons explaining the prevalence of these linkages are technological and market uncertainty (Mody, 1990; Freeman, 1990).

The sheer ubiquity of learning in the literature has inevitably invited a wide range of definitions of what it is and what it encompasses. The definition used here includes the ways firms build and supplement their knowledge bases about technologies, products, and processes, and develop and improve organizational efficiency and the broad skills of their workforce (Dodgson, 1991a). It is assumed that organizational learning is more than the sum of the individuals' learning (Hedberg, 1981). Learning becomes organizationally engrained.

Organizations do not have brains, but they have cognitive systems and memories Members come and go, and leadership changes, but organizations' memories preserve certain behaviors, mental maps, norms, and values over time. (Hedberg, 1981, p. 6).

The learning activities of firms are heavily constrained. Strategic management theory tells us how difficult organizational change is, as strategies reflect existing capabilities and technologies. Ansoff (1968) highlights the extent of organizational resistance when strategies are amended. Porter (1990) describes the difficulties of change as past strategies become engrained in organizational routines. Information that would modify or challenge existing strategies is not sought or filtered out. He argues that firms are preoccupied with defending what they have, and how any change is tempered by the concern that there is much to lose.

Teece, Pisano, and Schuen's (1990) "dynamic capabilities" theory of strategic management argues competitiveness is derived from the ability to reproduce over time distinctive organizational competences. These competences are a reflection of, among other things, a firm's history, its technological "trajectory," and specific assets. For Pavitt (1991), innovative

activities are firm specific, cumulative, differentiated, and highly uncertain. Like Polanyi (1962), Pavitt argues the central importance of tacit knowledge obtained through experience and how this, among other things, ensures that what firms did in the past will condition what they do in the future. The range of technological options open to firms is strongly dependent on their accumulated skills in proximate technologies.

The latter two approaches centrally locate learning within their analyses and usefully highlight the firm specificity of strategies for dealing with technological turbulence. Firms are constrained in the strategies they adopt by their histories and existing technologies and organization, and technological trajectories, and the cumulative and tacit nature of much of their knowledge. This individuality of firms' learning capacities is also identified in other approaches, including that based on firms' "knowledge bases" (Metcalfe & Gibbons, 1989) and "core competencies" (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990).

Classic contingency theory tells us how environmental changes—in technology, or competition, for example—may affect organizational structures, and how there are particular organizational needs for firms operating in turbulent and uncertain environments (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). An important element of these organizational needs is the ability to learn. There is, however, no unifying theory of organizational learning: Fiol and Lyles' (1985) review of 15 works on learning found broad variations in the application of the term.

Some common features do emerge, however. For example, much of the literature on organizational learning distinguishes a hierarchy of learning, and describes how difficult organizations find "higher level" learning (Lyles, 1988; Argyris & Schon, 1978). Morgan (1986) analyzes the organizational inhibitors to learning. He describes how departmental structures focus the attention of their members on parochial rather than organization wide problems; how systems of accountability frequently foster defensiveness in attitudes; and how there is a gap between actors' rationalized statements of what they do and what actually occurs. A similar argument is developed by March (1991) who distinguishes "exploration" and "exploitation" in organizational learning. Exploitation involves the refining and extension of existing technologies and competences. Exploration is experimentation with new alternatives. As the returns of exploration are uncertain, long-term, and often negative, March argues that organizations have a "tendency to substitute exploitation of known alternatives for exploration of unknown ones."

In addition to the contextual, firm-specific constraints to learning there are, therefore, also internal organizational factors which inhibit higher level learning and encourage introspection and conservatism in learning.

These factors can be argued to have profound implications for firms during periods of turbulent technological change as they can restrict the learning, adaptation, and change necessary for continuing competitiveness.

Inter-organizational collaboration can assist the learning process (Lyles, 1988). It can bring new knowledge into the firm of a specific, project-based nature (lower level learning). It also can enable firms to reconsider their existing ways of doing things: be it in R&D organization (Clark, Hayes, & Lorenz, 1985), or indeed if collaboration proves successful it can perhaps lead to a realignment of business strategy through diversification (higher level learning) (Ciborra, 1991; Lyles, 1988; Dodgson, 1991b). Collaboration provides an opportunity to observe novelty through the approaches of partners, and can stimulate reconsideration of current practices. It can be an antidote to the "not-invented-here-syndrome" (Dodgson, 1991c), and learning vicariously can help prevent the repetition of mistakes.

TRUST BETWEEN FIRMS

According to many observers, learning in collaboration depends on high levels of trust between the partners (Lundvall, 1988; Buckley & Casson, 1988). High levels of trust enhances internal organizational effectiveness (Fox, 1974; Barnes, 1981), and trust facilitates continuing relationships between firms (Arrow, 1975; Macaulay, 1963). As technological collaboration has become more common, the levels and kind of trust relationships between firms has recently become a focus of attention (Jarillo, 1988; Sako, 1992). Lundvall (1988) argues that in order to overcome the inevitable uncertainties in product innovations . . . "Mutual trust and mutually respected codes of behavior will normally be necessary" (Lundvall, 1988, p. 52). Saxenian's (1991) study of Silicon Valley firms argues how they exchange sensitive information concerning business plans, sales forecasts, and costs, and have a mutual commitment to long-term relationships. This involves ". . . relationships with suppliers as involving personal and moral commitments which transcend the expectations of simple business relationships" (Saxenian, 1991, p. 428).

Hakansson and Johanson (1988) describe how over time interactions between firms build a range of commitments and bonds through a social exchange process. The bonds created are: technical, related to the technologies employed by the firms; knowledge, related to the parties' knowledge about their business; social, in the form of personal confidence; administrative, related to the administrative routines and procedures of the firms; and legal, in the form of contracts between the firms. These bonds create lasting relationships between the firms.

Such bonds are argued to be particularly strong in Japan. Ouchi (1986) describes a “social memory” comprising groups of Japanese firms and government agencies that develop community senses of social responsibility and equity. These groups remember past cooperativeness and conflict and have a capacity for reward and punishment. The development of the social bonds that enhance trust building are often argued to be culturally determined (Bianchi & Bellini, 1991). Freeman (1990) argues that it is because of the importance of personal trust relationships that cultural factors such as language, educational background, regional loyalties, shared ideologies and experiences and even common leisure interests will continue to play an important role in collaboration.

In one of the most recent and focused analyses of inter-firm trust, Sako (1991, 1992), in her study of subcontracting relationships in Britain and Japan, argues trust to be “a state of mind, an expectation held by one trading partner about another, that the other will behave in a predictable and mutually acceptable manner” (Sako, 1991, p. 377). She argues that there are different reasons for predictability in behavior, and this allows three types of trust to be distinguished. “Contractual trust” exists such that each partner adheres to agreements, and keeps promises. “Competence trust” concerns the expectation of a trading partner performing his role competently. “Goodwill trust” refers to mutual expectations of open commitment to each other.

. . . someone who is worthy of “goodwill” trust is dependable and can be credited with high discretion, as he can be expected to take initiative while refraining from unfair advantage taking . . . trading partners are committed to take initiatives (or exercise discretion) to exploit new opportunities over and above what was explicitly promised (Sako, 1991, p. 379).

Such high levels of trust often underpin the success of Japanese customer/supplier interactions. If this success is to be replicated in R&D, trust must extend beyond that of expectations of partners to contribute what was contractually obliged of them. The level of trust in the relationship should also encompass unexpected and unsolicited suggestions for partner’s benefit in the expectation that in the future they may be reciprocated.

THE PERSONAL STIMULI TO LEARNING AND TRUST

Good inter-personal relationships, and effective communications, are continually identified by case studies to be critical in maintaining trust between partners and encouraging learning (Dickson et al., 1990; Dodgson, 1991c). Informal, inter-personal collaboration is argued by some to be the most prevalent source of inter-firm collaboration. Von Hippel (1988), for example, refers to the centrality of “invisible colleges” of peers trading

know-how in the innovation process. Kreiner and Schultz (1990) describe the intricate personal linkages between different organizations in biotechnology which lead to knowledge flows, and sometimes act as a precursor to formal collaboration.

The role of key individuals within the process of collaboration and innovation is well known. The innovation literature, for example, refers to “technological gatekeepers”; individuals whose role is to search for and disseminate useful information (Allen, 1977). The latter function has some resonance with the concept of “boundary spanning,” derived from the social psychology of learning (Michael, 1973). Boundary spanners generate, carry, and feed back information, and are argued to be essential elements in effective organizations. The functions of boundary spanners include “scanning, stimulating data-generating activity, monitoring, evaluating data relevance, transmitting information, and facilitating interpersonal intercourse” (Michael, 1973, p. 240). Individual’s communication paths across boundaries is an essential element of all theories of organizational learning.

Much attention in the management of inter-firm linkages is focused on the role of project managers (Devlin & Bleackley, 1988; Dodgson, 1991c). Particularly important in these analyses are the ways in which the project managers generate high levels of trust with their counterparts in partner organizations. All the literature on successful innovation and collaboration emphasizes the need for top management commitment and support, and the need for powerful individuals to assume the role of “project champion” (Rothwell et al., 1974).

Much of the literature on learning and trust in collaboration is concerned, therefore, with *inter-personal* relationships. However, these, as we shall see in the cases described below, can break down. In order for the collaborations to continue successfully, as have the examples, then the trust relationships underpinning them also need to have their own dynamic and be engrained within organizations’ routines and practices. This will be examined following description of the collaborations.

TWO COLLABORATIONS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY

Biotechnology provides a classic case of a new technology invoking changes in industrial organization. Three major groups of actors have been involved in the industrial development of biotechnology: universities and teaching hospitals, large multinational firms (mainly in pharmaceuticals), and start-up, new firms: the so-called dedicated biotechnology firms (DBFs). Each of these three groups has made important and different contributions in the progress of the commercialization of biotechnology.

There have been very high levels of collaborative activity between them (Hagedoorn & Schakenraad, 1990; Arora & Gambadella, 1990; Pisano, Shan, & Teece, 1988).

The turbulence caused by biotechnology induces uncertainty in key activities for firms, such as R&D and manufacturing, and increases the need for firms to learn from external sources. The new techniques of biotechnology provides a totally new means of product development in areas such as pharmaceuticals. The emergence of biotechnology in the science base in the mid 1970s, rather than in large-firm R&D departments, and the continuing importance of scientific research, has, for example, stimulated large firms to work collaboratively with DBFs as it is they who possess the organizational flexibility to work more quickly and effectively with universities and research laboratories (Dodgson, 1991d). New, small firms are unconstrained by many of the factors identified by the organization theory and strategic management literature which may limit large firms' freedom to respond quickly. These factors include the development of inhibitory loops and introspection and conservatism in learning, and the firm-specific nature of strategic technology management related to historical circumstances and the cumulative and tacit nature of technological knowledge that constrain novel activities. DBFs' organizational structures, strategies, and routines are more adaptable, and they do not face the problem of "unlearning" (Hedberg, 1981).

While there have been a number of studies of the extensive collaborative activity of individual firms (Dodgson, 1990a; Freeman & Barley, 1990), there are few studies which have examined these linkages in any depth. In what follows, two collaborations of Celltech Ltd, a leading, 400-employee British DBF, will be examined.

Celltech, which was established in 1979, has pursued a strategy based on the fast generation and acquisition of the two fundamental bases of biotechnology— Monoclonal Antibodies (MAbs) and Recombinant DNA (rDNA) technology— through external linkages, organization structures, employment practices, and incentives conducive to learning. This paper focuses on the first of these factors, concentrating on two particularly important linkages (for an examination of the latter issues, see Dodgson, 1992; for a more detailed description of the broad range of external linkages enjoyed by Celltech, see Rothwell & Dodgson, 1991). To facilitate this strategy of external orientation, the company developed a receptive, learning culture (described in Dodgson, 1991d), and similar to the classic Burns and Stalker (1961) "organic" style of management.

Links with academia have been very important for Celltech. In its first 10 years, it worked collaboratively with 42 universities and research laboratories; one-third of which were overseas. The most important of

these has been with the U.K.'s Medical Research Council (MRC) which was crucial to Celltech's formation and central to its past and present scientific development. When Celltech was formed, it began with an agreement with the MRC giving it exclusive rights to exploitation of MRC discoveries in biotechnology. This was a considerable concession; the MRC possessed world-leading science, and it was in one of its laboratories that the science and technology of MAbs was discovered. Senior administrators and scientists in the MRC explain this concession as a result of a disillusionment with the reticence of large British firms to engage in biotechnology research, and a belief in the potential of Celltech and its management (Dodgson, 1990b). The caution shown by large firms at this time reflected the novelty and uncertainty of the new technology, and its potential to disrupt existing organizational patterns in their R&D. Being new, Celltech was not, of course, effected by these constraints, and had no need for "unlearning."

The partnership was built upon reciprocated need, and community of intent. The MRC was under considerable political pressure to improve its technology transfer capabilities (Dodgson, 1990b), and wished to build its links with industry. Celltech needed to access the novel skills of biotechnology which the MRC possessed in order to establish itself as a business. It was the agreement with the MRC which crucially attracted investment into Celltech. Both partners were keen to demonstrate the industrial efficacy of the new and uncertain biotechnology. The agreement between the two parties has gone through three different stages.

The relationship has been close. The MRC provided Celltech with its first products and continuing collaboration has given the company a number of other products and potential products. A number of key Celltech scientists were recruited from the MRC, and the MRC recruited a Celltech scientist to run its technology transfer organization. The Secretary of the MRC at Celltech's foundation sat on the Board of the company for 8 years, and continues a link on a consultancy basis. Despite the high level of interaction between the two organizations, the relationship between the MRC and Celltech has not always been smooth.

For Celltech, relations with the MRC in the early years were mixed. To some extent, the problems were believed to be inevitable. The expectations of two organizations with different ethos and aims, one commercial the other scientific, had to converge. Practices had to be established in an area where no previous role models existed (the MRC had no previous experience of such an arrangement). Generating good working arrangements between individual researchers required an understanding of the pressures facing others and this took time. There was initial disquiet within

the MRC at the way the company was addressing different technologies to the ones the MRC proffered.

An important factor facilitating the collaboration was the shared scientific culture of Celltech and MRC scientists. They were aware of each other's reputations and scientific prowess, and although Celltech's scientists worked in a commercial environment they were similarly imbued in the "academic" culture of shared knowledge. It is common in bio-chemical and biological research for scientists openly to exchange materials for research purposes. This openness was not impeded by Celltech managers acting proprietorially, and was in fact encouraged by them.

The original agreement provided for a review after 3 years. It had attracted some hostility both initially from MRC scientists, some of whom thought they could get a better deal with a larger company, and some who were unhappy at dealing with commercial firms, and from politicians concerned with "monopoly" rights. The review was duly conducted in 1983 and the exclusivity agreement was removed by mutual consent. Both parties claimed to have developed such close working relationships that the existing agreement was no longer necessary and a more general 5-year agreement was signed reflecting greater legal and administrative confidence in one another. The company retained full rights to ideas already adopted, and to MRC research funded by Celltech. A benefit the company enjoyed from this new arrangement was that it was no longer obliged to assess every discovery offered to it, a time-consuming and often wasted effort.

During this 5-year agreement there was a shift toward covering individual collaborations with specific collaboration agreements with their own provisions for funding and intellectual property rights, particularly in the field of antibody engineering. However, even as the problems of collaboration at an inter-organizational level were being sorted out, individual problems continued. One particularly important collaboration for Celltech on "humanizing" mouse MAbs was initially troubled by many of the problems that had faced agreements from the start: namely, a concern among individual scientists about links with commerce, and a concern that Celltech might not provide the most generous financial rewards. This problem was eventually overcome. Within Celltech this episode is described as an example of how, even when there is considerable experience in undertaking collaborations, and a convergence in expectations from both organizations about the form and benefits of these linkages, problems continually arise between (opinionated) individuals.

A further 5-year agreement between Celltech and the MRC was signed in 1988. The main provision of the agreement was to ensure good communication between the two. The MRC is to bring to Celltech's attention

inventions which the company is well placed to commercialize, and Celltech is to update MRC of its technical (and, where relevant, business) focus. Regular quarterly meetings are held to exchange information. Disagreements still arise; in one particular instance over the treatment by Celltech's senior management of an agreement with the MRC as a commercial rather than a collaborative research project. Again, within Celltech, these difficulties are ascribed to differences of opinion on the part of a strong personality (in this case on Celltech's side).

Despite these continuing problems, according to senior Celltech and MRC managers and scientists, the agreements have proved very beneficial to both parties. Both have learned about the costs and benefits of collaboration; Celltech has built its science and product base, the MRC has benefitted financially, and its scientists have overcome their initial concerns about dealing with industry. The Celltech/MRC link has been described as "one of the most successful transfers of academic science into industry" (*Financial Times*, November 12, 1988). Both organizations enjoyed "higher" level learning in that their collaboration affected change in the kind of organization they were. Celltech's initial strategy of transferring technology from the MRC into industry provided a base for its subsequent strategy of developing its own technology. The MRC learned for the first time that it could deal successfully with industry, and it overcame some strongly engrained concerns from its scientists about doing so (Dodgson, 1990b). Their link successfully displayed the industrial efficacy of biotechnology.

The factors underlying its success, according to staff in both organizations, are: long-term perseverance; belief in the other's scientific and managerial competences; considerable efforts to ensure that the management, administrative, and review systems are developed appropriate to the needs of collaborations; convergence in inter-personal expectations so that good working relationships can be established; and the development of trust between the partners so that each is believed by the other not to have hidden agendas. Managers in both organizations endeavored continually to accentuate the visibility of the collaboration and its outcomes, through, for example, visits and seminars.

Celltech has enjoyed a large number of corporate collaborations. It has engaged in a range of contract collaborations with many of the world's largest pharmaceutical companies. The company has benefitted from these collaborations financially, and has also done so in the building up of skills and competences necessary to undertake the contracts. An example of these linkages is provided by its evolving relationship with a large U.S. company, American Cyanamid. Celltech and American Cyanamid first signed a 2-year R&D contract in 1986, and this was renewed annually in 1988

and 1989. This contractual arrangement was revised into a cooperation agreement between the two companies in 1990.

The contracts have focused on an area of high uncertainty and novelty: the R&D and manufacture of MAbs for the diagnosis and treatment of cancer. Celltech's contribution of expertise lies in the ability to "engineer" antibodies to make them function more efficiently, in this case to "target" tumors. American Cyanamid's expertise lies in toxins. The technologies are, therefore, highly complementary. Celltech's antibodies are intended to deliver American Cyanamid's toxins to the tumor.

Again, the relationship was built upon mutual need. The agreements with American Cyanamid have been critical to Celltech financially. By 1990 they had brought over £10 million into a company which is small and has very high internal R&D commitments. Commercially, it has enhanced Celltech's market credibility, and a number of potential products are in the pipeline, including two which are planned to enter clinical trials in 1992. Scientifically, the projects have progressed such that a family of patent applications has been produced in three scientific areas, around 30 in all (patent protection is very important in biotechnology), and around a dozen academic papers have been published on the research. The research has also been instrumental in Celltech building up its core technological base. Although in the initial contracts the results of the research into cancer were owned by American Cyanamid, Celltech retained rights to all non-cancer discoveries. When undertaking project-specific research, Celltech has in the process to develop what it calls "enabling" technology which is necessary for the conduct of the project and has broader applications. Through the course of these agreements, Celltech has significantly expanded its "enabling" technology (Rothwell & Dodgson, 1991). Cyanamid's concern lay with quickly developing the new biotechnology skills.

At the start of the arrangement with Cyanamid, Celltech had a project manager responsible for it. A top British scientist was recruited especially to run the initial contracts. As the program was scientific in nature it was considered that a scientist rather than a professional manager would be the best person to manage it. However, considerable efforts were made to develop the management skills of the scientist. Apart from the managerial tasks of dealing with budgets and deadlines, a major part of the project leader's job is involved with communication. Keeping the partner informed is seen as crucially important as has been building up the personal links and trust between individuals. The series of contracts with Cyanamid have not been entirely bilateral. A national research laboratory, a university, and a hospital have played an important role in the conduct and outcomes of the research. The management skills required have also included those of operating a broad research network.

According to managers and scientists in Celltech, much of the trust and confidence necessary within the relationship, particularly in the early stages of the arrangement, depended on good personal relationships. Celltech enjoyed particularly strong and respectful relationships at chief executive and scientific director levels with its counterparts in Cyanamid. High levels of trust were essential for Celltech as it became highly dependent upon Cyanamid financially and for market and scientific credibility. For Cyanamid, it was necessary as it expected demonstrable scientific success from Celltech in order for its managers to continue to champion its cause internally so as to compete for resources with other Cyanamid managers championing in-house development of biotechnology in this area.

The strong inter-personal linkages between the two firms have endured some serious setbacks. For example, a potentially disruptive event occurred in 1988 with the retirement from Cyanamid of two senior scientific managers. These managers were highly supportive of the deal with Celltech, and their replacements began to review all such arrangements. Initially skeptical of the scientific objectives of the program, these new managers came to support them.

More seriously, Celltech in late 1990 underwent a radical change of circumstances. This occurred due to the collapse of its major shareholder. At the same time a number of senior managers in Celltech reached pre-arranged retirement. These managers, including the chief executive and the "project champion" had very strong links with Cyanamid. Also the scientist project manager, although intimately tied into the project for many years, was sacked for internal reasons. The project then became the responsibility of somebody at Director level. Despite these changes in personnel, and in the circumstances which faced Celltech, its agreement with Cyanamid continued, and in fact became more of a partnership with greater sharing of scientific inputs and outcomes. This reflects the continuing realization of the logic of the partnership, technologically and commercially, and an acute awareness throughout Celltech's management and staff of the importance of the linkage.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper has argued the importance of learning stimulated and sourced externally in times of turbulent technological change. The paper has not attempted to examine internally generated learning, nor study the breadth of learning companies undergo. It does not examine the relationship between internally and externally sourced learning, and the all-important mechanisms by which learning is diffused throughout organizations. It is limited to a preliminary examination of some of the difficulties

and constraints of developing external learning capacities, and the role trust plays in facilitating these.

External learning is necessary as firms need continually to respond to the rapid and radical technological and market changes currently occurring. Collaborations are formed among other reasons to allow firms to transfer new knowledge which is often firm-specific and tacit in nature. There are, however, many problems for organizations in developing external orientations and learning capacities. Their strategic decision making tends to reflect past histories, and to be based upon existing technologies and capabilities. Organizations furthermore tend toward introspection and conservatism in their learning activities.

Trust has been argued to facilitate learning between partners. Analyses of trust tend to focus on the relationships of key individuals: managers, scientists, and engineers. Some analyze the cultural specificity of this form of trust. Little account is taken, however, of inter-organizational trust. Using the example of a firm which has benefitted very considerably from academic and industrial linkages, it has been shown how these are typified by continuing tensions and problems. Virtually all studies of external linkages refer to the problems involved, and the management requirements of them are extensive. Given the problems of labor turnover and the continuing likelihood of communications breakdown on the part of individuals, to survive these trust between organizations has to be general as well as specific to individuals. Bonds between companies move beyond the personal and become administrative and legal, and are forged between firms with compatible knowledge bases producing mutual benefit. As shown in the examples, collaboration can survive disruptive inter-personal rows, and the loss of important individuals provided trust is broad-based. Trust, just as learning does in Hedberg's sense, becomes engrained in organizational routines, norms, and values. It becomes part of the learned product of group experience that is culture (Schein, 1985). The shared scientific culture of the partners in the case studies, and the community of intent, facilitated the success of the collaborations.

Two assumptions underpin this view of trust. First, that the technological and commercial logic of the collaboration remains and there is general knowledge of this and agreement about it. Second, that the relationship will necessarily be long-term. In order to jointly develop new products and processes, and to match tacit and firm-specific skills and knowledge, a long-term perspective is necessary. A long-term commitment allows for adaptability in objectives, and is conducive to learning. This is accepted to be so by the literature on collaboration. For example, adaptability in the focus and objectives of inter-firm linkages are inevitable given the way the bargaining power of partners varies over time (Kogut, 1988),

the original reasons for forming the linkage may alter or become obsolete over time (Harrigan, 1986), and the way initial agreements often focus on the wrong sets of issues (Lyles, 1988). Furthermore, it is only within a long-term horizon that reciprocity in collaboration can occur. At any one time one partner will be a net gainer in a collaboration. The disincentive to cut and run is based on the view of future gains which can only be achieved through continuity of collaboration. Trust mitigates against opportunistic reactions. Similarly, fear of mistrust on the part of future new partners should a firm behave in such a manner is another consideration.

High trust is associated with respect for partner's abilities, commitment based on the belief of mutual benefit, and openness and honesty in objectives. These indications of high trust are similar to those identified by Sako (1992) in her study of the benefits of "obligational trading relationships" in subcontracting arrangements in Britain and Japan. They need to transcend individual relationships. This paper provides an early attempt to examine the question of trust among firms collaborating in their technological activities. In an area ripe for future research, questions arise of whether what Sako describes as "goodwill trust" is more common when trust is inter-organizational, and whether and in what form the high levels of "latent" trust found in common contractual forms of inter-corporate relationships (Macaulay, 1963) are made more manifest in these more flexible and open-ended arrangements.

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

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From Postmodern Anthropology to Deconstructive Ethnography

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The social sciences have recently exhibited renewed interest in ethnography while traditional anthropology has been struggling with the challenges of postmodernism. This paper considers the theoretical implications of the potential convergence of these strands, with particular reference to the ethnography of organizations. Postmodernism is seen to affect ethnography by problematizing the processes of description, reference, and the establishment of authority in ethnographic texts. It offers, rather than a "scientific" model, a "literary" model of such texts in which description is an active construction rather than a neutral recording of the other's world. Ostensive reference becomes displaced by evocation, the single authorial voice by the "heteroglossia" of many contributing voices. Unfortunately, there is a tendency for the processes of interpretation to be abandoned to a free play of unlimited signification in which any and all meanings are possible, which jettisons rigor and with it critical acerbity. This paper argues for the development of deconstructive ethnography grounded in the work of Jacques Derrida. This ethnographic praxis would demystify social and organizational actions by revealing their inevitable and ever-present internal contradictions without resorting to an externally contrived theoretical or moral standard. It would realize its emancipatory potential through "self-deconstruction."

KEY WORDS: ethnography; deconstruction; postmodernism; social investigation.

INTRODUCTION

The recent "postmodern" turbulence in the social sciences has been characterized by the challenge to the ability of rational, objective science to provide absolute and unitary knowledge of reality. This has produced a shift of emphasis toward a relativist position, emphasizing multiple realities, fragmentation, plurality, subjectivity, and a concern with the means by

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which social life is represented in accounts which create rather than simply transmit its meaning. This has included a critique and rejection of positivistic science, in epistemology and methodology, and the divisions of conceptual labor which it implied. The “blurring of genres” has in turn produced a new genre, that of “theory,” which ranges across philosophy, literature, art, and the social sciences.

Ethnography has received renewed attention in this context for several reasons. As a methodology it has the capacity to embody a variety of perspectives and settings; it can be regarded as the natural methodological and discursive response to epistemological and existential fragmentation; as a qualitative account its strength has been its theoretical description; it adapts easily to the “linguistic turn” in social analysis and incorporates an awareness of subjectivity; and it offers the possibility of “ethical” social science. It has been characterized as *the* language of post-modernism.

There has also been a remarkable increase of borrowing from social anthropology and ethnography of concepts and methods in other areas of the social sciences (Hammersley, 1990; Stanley, 1990) particularly in the cultural analysis of organizations (Allaire & Firsirotu, 1984; Alvesson, 1984; Helmers, 1991; Rosen, 1991 a,b; Van Maanen & Barley, 1985). Contemporaneous with this propulsion of ethnography to increased significance within the social sciences has emerged an internal critique promoting a post-modern ethnography based on multiple voices and self-reflexivity in producing accounts. However, this has not examined adequately the implications of Derrida’s deconstruction (a key term in postmodern arguments) for the analysis of social action. This paper outlines the main features of ethnography, its post-modern developments, and the critical issues which arise for social analysis. It then re-examines post-modern ethnography against a methodology of deconstruction in order to explore how and whether theory can remain important for post-modern social analysis in the light of such critique. Finally, some conclusions are drawn as to the consequences for the praxis of a deconstructive ethnography as a methodology for social investigation in organizational settings.

POST-MODERNISM AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

It is becoming almost commonplace for social scientists to argue that we are living under conditions of “postmodernity” — a particular set of historical-social, economic, and technological conditions with an associated intellectual-cultural tradition of “post-modernism” which reflects upon and interprets it, supportively or critically (Harvey, 1989; Parker, 1992; Rose, 1991). This tradition is of course by no means homogeneous,

and in what follows I seek to evoke significant dimensions of “post-modernism” rather than to define it. Similarly, in attempting to characterize the “modernism” against which the former gains its distinctiveness (Cooper & Burrell, 1988; Power, 1990; Daudi, 1990; Sotto, 1990), I run the risk of implying an idealized or fantasized unity within the wide variety of post-enlightenment responses to classicism (Giddens, 1992; Bauman, 1991). Certainly the idea of an epistemological break between modernity and postmodernity has its challengers (Reed, forthcoming), and any attempt to characterize the two will be replete with exceptions. Simultaneously, one cannot confine a metaphysical disjuncture within any historical periodization, and examples of precursors of postmodern thought can be found in literature and philosophy even when “modernism” was flourishing (which is entirely consistent with Derrida’s concept of “supplementary logic” which I discuss below). Nevertheless, the context of later arguments requires some sketching, however crude and indicative rather than refined and definitive.

Post-modernism has been seen to run epistemologically against the enlightenment emphasis on reason, logic, and rationality as the foundation of scientific method and the basis for the establishment of “truth.” This became associated with a realist ontology in which the world and its structuring principles, or laws, were assumed to be accessible through the correct method of observation and analysis. This produced a commitment to the unfolding of progress through history, the incremental growth of knowledge through science and the resulting inevitable subordination of nature to culture and the control of man. Its particular *praxis* could be characterized by a social technology of division of labor, specialization, bureaucracy, hierarchy, and legitimacy, operationalized by autonomous, individual, even “bourgeois” selves (Moult, 1990; Habermas, 1975; Sampson, 1989, pp. 3-6). The *modernist* project was accomplished through language which, though not regarded as a transparent window on reality, nevertheless was always treated as expressing something other than itself and was governed by “grammatical principles” which determined it (see Derrida’s 1982 critique of Saussure). Explorations in language therefore were in pursuit of the “already made-up mind” (Cooper and Burrell, 1988, p. 94). the “logos,” the totalizing and controlling influence which held all the answers humankind could seek, and would yield them up to the correct approach.

Post-modernism, in contradistinction, challenges the claims of science to establish authoritative or absolute knowledge, exposing its social nature as a practical accomplishment by scientists as a community (Kuhn, 1962; Hassard, 1990) and seeking to impose its own models on reality. The logical incremental growth of knowledge by confirmation and proof is contested

by a *para*-logical movement of disconfirmation and disproof, in a mood of suspicion rather than optimism (Lyotard, 1984). Similarly the authority of “meta-narratives,” and any transcendent governing principle of authority or authenticity is challenged, blurring, or dissolving the “division of labor” between genres, literature, philosophy, science, or poetry (Geertz, 1983). An emerging focus is on the means by which “truth-effects” come to be produced and consumed in symbolic structures, on the “textual strategies” which stage meaning rather than the underlying principles which determine it, a movement from the hermeneutics of interpretation to the poetics of representation. Consequently, as the determinacy of meaning by a flow of intentionality from origin to recipient is called into question, so the constructive effects of the medium of transmission (language, symbol, or the mass media) and the creative possibilities of the “reader” (through “bricolage”) are emphasized. Knowledge becomes relative, not absolute, and the acceptance of multiple, fragmented realities is seen to displace the idea of one unitary transcendent reality. The selves who experience these realities are increasingly regarded as more of a social and shifting phenomenon than an integral cohesive one. In human organizations, *internally governed* hierarchies of merit, authority, and legitimacy are giving way to networks, partnerships, shifting, fluid, and *externally determined* social and organizational structures (e.g., market or competition driven), *ad hoc*, short-term, fragmentary, and localized.

THE ETHNOGRAPHIC APPROACH

The term “ethnography” covers a diversity of positions, at the level of technique, methodology, or epistemology. Gill and Johnson (1991, p. 92) following Wax (1971) note varieties as far back as the fifth century B.C., and trace the development of industrial ethnography and historiography characteristic of British sociology (Burrell, 1990). In anthropology itself the great role models of Radcliffe-Brown, Malinowski, Boas, Mead, Evans-Pritchard, and Levi-Strauss influenced, in parallel, the continued development of the urban-industrial ethnographic tradition through the “Chicago School” of sociology and the studies of Whyte (1955/1981), Roy (1969, 1973), Gouldner (1954a,b), and Dalton (1959). These participant observation studies took industrial sociology forward, as Stanley (1990, p. 620) notes by paying

. . . attention to the minutiae of everyday life, being both in and yet not of the milieu studied, a concern with the micropolitics of everyday life, and a focus on the public and not the more private aspects.

The influence of ethnomethodology in the sixties and seventies emphasized the rule-governed negotiation of intersubjectivity, the mutually defining emergence of structure in process and process in structure (Garfinkel, 1967/1987). A self-reflexive acknowledgment of the ethnographer as the producer of an ethnographic account also involved the recognition that these accounts “glossed” the real world in a theoretically more sophisticated variant of everyday practice, and that “talk” was the primary means of analytic description and exchange in everyday life (Stanley, 1990). Local language forms, terms, and argot became just as important as the foreign languages which the more exotic anthropologists studied.

The Chicago ethnographies and those influenced by them have been criticized for a naive “urbane romanticism,” glorifying the underdog and seeking rationality in the irrational, order in disorder, and novelty wherever they could find it (Hammersley, 1990). Their concentration on the margins of society, skid row alcoholics, street corner gangs, drug-users, and others could with some justification be said to have reduced the capacity of such ethnography for relevant critique. However, there is a direct and pertinent critique of managerial rationality in the work of Roy (1969; see also Turner, 1990, pp. 84-85), the more explicitly Marxist orientation of Burawoy (1979), and several parallel critical studies including those by Lupton (1963), Beynon (1973), and Nichols and Armstrong (1976) in the U.K. Rosen (1991a, p. 11) argues that the current task of the critical organizational ethnographer lies in deconstructing the richly textured social realities of organizations to lay bare power relations, making them accessible to other audiences:

. . . taking the familiar minutiae of everyday organizational lives — corporate charts, business suits, luncheon meetings, department meetings, hallway conversations, annual reviews and raises, profit goals, widgets sold, bathroom banter, birthday parties — and weaving them into a presentation in which, when it is successful, we are met full force with the equally enlightening and disequilibrating implications of viewing a world which is our own largely demystified within its own cultural frame (Rosen, 1991a, p. 15).

This embeddedness of ethnography in the ordinary processes of understanding in everyday life is also indicated by Sanday (1979), who observes a general sense of the term being that which any observer of and reflector upon social life does, be they novelist, poet, artist, journalist, or any other witness to human nature. “Paradigmatic” ethnography is distinguished by formalized use of theory or models taken from academic literature to inform this interpretation. It is this use of theory which, as Rosen (1991a, p. 13) indicates, has been regarded as ethnography’s distinctive strength over other forms of description, notwithstanding Hammersley’s (1990) critique.

DESCRIPTION

Description is central to the ethnographic enterprise. Approached from a positivistic perspective, the ethnographer's task would be simply to ensure that

. . . all the facts should be carefully observed and described, without allowing any theoretical preconception to decide whether some are more important than others (Levi-Strauss, 1977, p. 280).

Although this differs from the model of positivistic science which involves the testing of a hypothesis under controlled conditions, ethnography has been viewed as a pre-hypothetical stage of science, a pre-science. The important point for both approaches is that at the experimental stage the observer should be neutral, and all possible steps should be taken to minimize intrusion or bias. Intrinsically alienating, this approach embodies "a naive empiricism which can only see what is not before its nose" (Webster, 1983) or at least, can only recognize it as fact if it can be demonstrated that the presence of the nose is irrelevant to the experience of the phenomenon. Description in this form of social science is referential; it provides "information about" whatever is the topic in hand (Stanley, 1990). The project of writing ethnography differs from that of most other sociological accounts in retaining description as a central feature, where other approaches tend to strip away the descriptive base and write as though about the phenomenon itself (Stanley, 1990; Rosen, 1991b). Nevertheless, in positivistic ethnography the representational problem is constructed as the epistemological one of

. . . preventing subjective views from coloring objective facts . . . a clash between seeing things as one would have them and seeing them as they really are (Geertz, 1988, p. 9).

The efforts, or pretensions, of anthropologists seeking to reduce or eradicate such authorial bias have led to the adoption of various prophylactic strategies. These include:

. . . "authorial self-inspection" and self-criticism, which ironically is considered basic to cultural field research but is constructed as a form of tool-cleaning and is inevitably truncated and expunged from the final record (Geertz, 1988, p. 145; Webster, 1983, p. 190). Some commentators go so far as to suggest that "being reflexive is virtually synonymous with being scientific" (Ruby and Meyerhoff, cited in Webster, 1983, p. 192); an illustration of how this may be necessary but is certainly not sufficient is provided in Fox and Moults's (1990, p. 169) discussion of self-reflexive interventions into corporate culture.

. . . treatment of personal field notes and diaries not as personal documents but, alienated and abstracted from their authorship, as reduced to abstract data (Webster, 1983, p. 192).

. . . this allows the more complete emergence of “text positivism” (Geertz, 1988, p. 145) in which the author becomes a mere honest broker for the transcription of reality.

. . . a related but more active pretension is the claim to speak from *within* another form of life, not just about it, presenting the native point of view in what Geertz, (1988, p. 145) calls “ethnographic ventriloquism.”

. . . a perhaps more complex problem of “confessionalism,” in which the writer presents the other form of life in terms of its impact on him/her, through direct experience. Ironically, this is likely to be reincorporated along with other forms of reflexive ethnography into positivism, “patronizingly misconstrued as subjectivism which not merely complements objectivity but actually serves in its ideological legitimation,” i.e., it makes it necessary (Webster, 1983, p. 192).

REFERENTIALITY

Positivistic ethnography depends for its success on its ability to be taken as an accurate, or at least convincingly persuasive, account of something other than itself—the real world of the “native”—yet as Stanley (1990, p. 624) observes “very few ethnographies would pass representational muster when judged by members.” On the one hand, this could be viewed as a failure of referentiality, bad technique; on the other, it may be that the existence of multiple realities makes the unity of this “other world” illusory, and the unruly nature of experience which is “garrulous, over-determined . . . shot through with power relations and personal cross-purposes” is misrepresented in its circumscription in a cohesive account (Clifford, 1988, p. 25). Clifford (1986, p. 6; see also Birth, 1990, p. 550) argues that ethnography fails with regard to referentiality in four main ways:

- (i) It is a literary work and consists of literary devices which limit and distort reality, conveying much of its meaning metaphorically (see also Atkinson, 1990) and hence limiting and distorting the representation of “culture.”
- (ii) Purely objective ethnography is impossible, because ethnographies are determined contextually (they draw on and create meaningful social milieux); rhetorically (they use and are used by expressive conventions); institutionally (they are written within and against specific traditions, disciplines and audiences); generically (they are usually distinguishable from novels or travel accounts though possessing elements of both); politically (the authority to represent cultural realities is unequally shared and may be contested); and historically (all the above conventions and constraints are changing).
- (iii) Cultures are composed of multiple voices, but ethnography can present only a few and frequently only one. The representation of culture is therefore at best only partial.
- (iv) Culture is constantly changing and emergent but is usually presented as being fixed. Ethnography cannot present cultural fluidity as it truly exists.

This situation amounts to a crisis of representation in the interpretative sciences (Clifford & Marcus, 1986; Jeffcutt, 1991; see Sangren, 1988 and

Birth, 1990 for an alternative view) in which the ability of science “to encompass adequately the detailed reality of motivated, intentional life” (Marcus & Fischer, 1986, p. 165) becomes problematic. Anthropology is accordingly “at the vortex of the debate about the problem of representing society in contemporary discourses” (Marcus & Fischer, 1986, p. vii). Representation as used here has a two-fold sense (Norris, 1990, p. 29). The first sense is that of the capacity of reason to grasp or interpret the truths of experience in a way that is answerable or accountable with respect to adequacy when interrogated from the perspective of other experiences (re-presenting). Although this carries with it a sense of symbolic reproduction Hammersley (1990, p. 606) exaggerates this in his characterization of the “reproduction model” as one in which the aim is “to provide descriptions that *reproduce* some portion of the world,” seeking to approximate “one true description” even if that necessitates the incorporation of multiple accounts. The second sense is that of the author or ethnographer — how representative is he/she of other human interests within the wider society and the ethnographic community, and could the audience as a result expect to experience his/her encounters in similar ways and hence trust his/her description; and also how well and with what authority is the “tribe” studied represented — could he/she be said to speak for them? The single term representation carries then a *double duality* — the epistemological one of construction/reproduction and the moral-ethical one of representation of communities to audiences. Hammersley’s analysis manhandles this rather delicate nexus rather too crudely, but his argument is not without a point which needs to be considered in the light of recent responses to this “crisis.”

ETHNOGRAPHY AS LITERATURE

One increasingly common response to the problem of representation is to concentrate on the means by which representation is achieved, to treat ethnography as a literary form. This has considered the rhetorical features of ethnography (Pearce & Chen, 1989), ethnography as a form of dialogue (Dwyer, 1977, 1979), as a form of storytelling (Webster, 1982, 1983), as a text (Marcus & Cushman, 1982) or as a kind of writing (Clifford & Marcus, 1986; Geertz, 1988; Atkinson, 1990; Jeffcutt, 1991). This orientation has provoked the objection that

. . . concentrating our gaze on the ways in which knowledge claims are advanced undermines our capacity to take any of those claims seriously. Somehow, attention to such matters as imagery, metaphor, phraseology or voice is supposed to lead to a corrosive relativism in which everything is but a more or less clever expression of opinion. Ethnography becomes, it is said, a mere game of words, as poems and novels are supposed to be (Geertz, 1988, p. 2).

Geertz himself has been the target of criticism for his self-consciously rhetorical style (see Pearce & Chen, 1989) and his unwillingness to pursue many of the more orthodox canons of science which would allow others to put his interpretations to the test (Shankman, 1984). However, if ethnography achieves its persuasive force in these more literary ways then no scientific purpose will be served by suppressing it. As Atkinson (1990, p. 180) argues, ethnography

. . . cannot inhabit a world of texts where conventionality is taken for granted, or where language is treated as unproblematic. The fully mature ethnography requires a reflexive awareness of its own writing, the possibilities and limits of its own language and a principled exploration of its own modes of representation.

The post-modern ethnographer is somewhat perplexingly faced by the intransigent problem of how to write in the light of this reflexivity — as illustrated by the paradoxical logocentrism of Atkinson's "full maturity." For Tyler (1986) and others this means abandoning reference in favor of evocation. Evocation is part of the poetic function of language; it evokes that which escapes reference. Where scientific language pays attention to its own rules and method, and in the pursuit of discrimination and sophistication perfects its own discourse internally by defining and qualifying its terms ever more rigorously, it becomes impenetrable. Orientated toward theory, it is limited to recognizing only that knowledge which can be described discursively. Referential language at the level of the everyday is motivated toward performance, and language is subordinated to the interests of getting things done, developing with the objective of getting them done perfectly. Orientated towards practice, it is confined to usage which produces action. However, in between these extremes of reference there is a range of association which resists tight definition, and in fact all scientific or performative statements have to be recast by their readers or recipients in terms of "where does it come from?" and "what does it mean to me?" with contexts, histories, and associations provided in order to make sense. This is an "ethnographic context" in itself, and this is why Tyler (1986, p. 122) states that ethnography is a "superordinate discourse to which all other discourses are relativized and in which they find their meaning and justification." The destruction of totalizing meta-narratives which is characteristic of post-modernism now means that "meaning" is not universal but fragmented and locally grounded, and ethnography is the process of achieving this grounding in a context which will sustain it: in Tyler's terms, "the discourse of the post-modern world" (p. 123).

Sperber (1975, pp. 112-113) expands one difficult aspect of Tyler's argument. He defines evocation as conveying that which necessarily escapes referential language. Sperber distinguishes the conceptual mechanism (which works through referential language) from the symbolic mechanism,

which can be at work at any time but which we don't consciously call on until the conceptual mechanism fails us, and we become literally unable to explain or account for something (for example, falling in love). The symbolic mechanism has two features, focalization and evocation (Sperber, 1975, pp. 119-123). The first consists of giving attention to a particular part of the world and endowing it with significance, giving relatively fixed meaning to particular signifiers. Evocation is rather more about the context, the backgrounded, subconscious, or implicit associations which are made at the same time. The connection between the two is similar to reading a book on a crowded tube train. Sperber (1975, pp. 115-119) uses smells as an illustration of evocation: the taste of the madeleine which stimulates Proust's *Remembrance of Things Past* is another example. Anything can start it; nothing seems to be able to stop it. Having said this, we do share experiences in common with other humans, live our lives within similar conventions, and are capable of making the same imaginative leaps. Accordingly, broad evocative fields can be discerned to give us a rough idea of how particular images might be received, but this cannot be controlled and any attempt to be deliberately evocative inevitably courts failure (as much of Tyler's paper does).

As Clifford (Clifford & Marcus, 1986, p. 26) argues

to recognize the poetic dimensions of ethnography does not require that one give up facts and accurate accounting for the supposed free play of poetry. "Poetry" is not limited to romantic or modernist subjectivism: it can be historical, precise, objective. And of course it is just as conventional and situationally determined as prose.

Birth (1990) notes this but has no clear idea of what the precision of poetry might entail — on the other hand, neither do many of the experimental ethnographers display this awareness prominently in their writing. There is no necessity for, nor should there be a call to, random signification nor a jettisoning of referential language, and Birth argues the case for reference with some care. Unfortunately, he would argue, Clifford's acceptance of stylistic precision is not carried through to the ontological and epistemological levels of placing some value on truth and some limits on relativity. This is partly a consequence of the rather widespread misunderstanding of structuralism and post-structuralism, and particularly the influential work of Jacques Derrida, among many American commentators and the resulting emergence of "vulgar deconstruction." However, before discussing this, I will turn to a consideration of a by-product of the awareness of ethnography's literary nature — the emergence of multiple voices in the text.

MULTIPLE VOICES

The interest in multiple voices in post-modern ethnography is in part epistemological, linked to the question of re-presentation; and in part ethical, linked to the question of representation. The recognition of the existence of multiple negotiated realities as part of the phenomenology of the social world brings into question the coherence of traditional anthropological representations of the other (Marcus & Cushman, 1982, p. 32). Anthropological accounts have inevitably suppressed, selected from, and synthesized these voices and a naturalistic response to this awareness is to attempt to weave these multiple voices into the text in order to be more faithful to the cultural realities being described (Birth, 1990, p. 551). As Tyler (1986, p. 161) argues

A post-modern ethnography is fragmentary because it cannot be otherwise. Life in the field is itself fragmentary, not at all organized around familiar ethnological categories such as kinship, economy and religion . . . we make do with a collection of indexical anecdotes or telling particulars with which to portend that larger unity beyond explicit textualization.

Bringing in these additional voices in the interests of realism might suggest that there is one "real world" in the sense of Hammersley's (1990) critique which it is the task of ethnography to represent accurately, no matter how many voices it should contain. Similarly, it also privileges the constitution of that world in the speech of the participants as having greater "authenticity" than its appropriation by any other means, in what might be termed multivocal phonocentrism. There is a real risk that "narrative realism merges innocently with realist goals and thence with positivist description of factual reality" (Webster 1983, p. 198).

Such stylistic heteroglossia bring into question the "authority" of the author as other voices are brought in alongside, and this alerts us to the ethical dimension which is a major objective of post-modern ethnography. In presenting the range of voices and fragments of the culture under study for his/her own audience, and in seeking not to impose textual authority or suppression on them ("flattening" at an analytical level) the ethnographer must presumably resist the temptation to exalt those voices which the culture itself silences if his/her objective is naturalism ("flattening" at the empirical level). Although Webster (1983, p. 198) argues that "an unacknowledged status as a literary genre becomes a binding social contract for its practitioners" in works of "dispersed authority" this may not, paradoxically, be sufficient to be "ethical" although it may allow the ethnographer to sidestep the charge of intellectual imperialism (Pearce & Chen, 1989, p. 128). The risk is that a truly naturalistic ethnography would of necessity

abrogate its critical capacity in reproducing the ideological presuppositions of the society under study.

No matter how relativistically different historical contexts are conceived, it seems that the discourse through which their self-knowledge is constituted or mystified is not, as Marx would say, disembodied; consequently there is a false-consciousness as well as a consciousness to be penetrated by critical theory (Webster, 1983, p. 199).

Geertz (1988, p. 140) argues that native voices cannot in any case speak alongside the writer in a direct and equal way and that despite their efforts to avoid imperialism ethnographers cannot evade

. . . the burden of authorship . . . however heavy it may have become; there is no possibility of displacing it on to "method," "language" or (an especially popular manoeuvre at the moment) "the people themselves" redescribed ("appropriated" is probably the better term) as coauthors.

Authors therefore cannot help but intervene in the process of re-presentation of the social group under scrutiny as Clifford ultimately seems to acknowledge (Clifford, 1983, p. 142). This is especially so in studying organizations which are a subsection of their own society and when their objective is to demystify that which is already substantially familiar to them (Rosen, 1991a, p. 15). Self-reflexivity is an important part of the process of investigation, presentation, and evocation of this social reality, even if that reality is multiplex and fragmented and the ideas of unity and authority must be brought into question. However, in regarding the problem of post-modern ethnography as being that of how to write ethnography in the light of such reflexivity, the problem of (and responsibility for) the interpretation of cultural forms has been displaced from the writer of ethnography to the reader of ethnographies as reading is implicitly acknowledged as a creative process. This need not and should not lead to a form of irreducible relativism in which any reading is as good as any other, a hermeneutic free-for-all; neither is this a conclusion which should be reached as a consequence of "deconstruction," the critical process adopted from Derrida which is widely regarded as the destruction of all stability in meaning and interpretation and the cornerstone of post-modern thought.

VULGAR DECONSTRUCTION

The "post-modern" ethnography we have discussed depends upon and focuses on anthropological texts as literary creations, fictions which present themselves as fact but which have no priority to that claim over other potential orderings of the world. This approach seems to have been influenced by American literary criticism which followed, after a fashion, Derrida. When Derrida (1978, pp. 278-293) presented his close

deconstructive reading of Levi-Strauss to critique and expose the assumptions of structuralism at the Johns Hopkins seminar in 1966, he was influential in the inauguration of post-structuralism across the Atlantic. His (1982, pp. 207-272) messages about language being metaphorical at its root, the undecidability of meaning, and the intertextuality of reading and writing had a catalytic, even inspiring effect on American literary criticism, and less spectacularly, philosophy. If all language was metaphorical, then all disciplines were figurative literary creations and literary criticism became not only a very important but the only discipline. Simultaneously, it was freed from any burden of judgment if all meaning was merely a re-ordering and other meanings were equally possible, and readers were capable of creating any interpretation they wished. Subsequently, reader-response theory (Fish, 1980; Rabinow, 1986; Birth, 1990) and Rorty's (1979, 1982) attacks on epistemology (Rabinow, 1986; Marcus & Fischer, 1986; see Norris 1985, 1990 for an alternative view) and meta-narrative have blended with Lyotard (1984) to displace some of the most important features of Derrida's thought, and to re-present his procedure of deconstruction in a generalized way. Turner (1983, p. 200), for example, conflates Levi-Strauss and Derrida as "structuralists" to the point of seeing Derrida as writing hermeneutic footnotes to the former's work:

. . . giving the readings is its own end, and the value of the readings is in the act of reading. . . . All other approaches are acceptable and valid for the structuralist . . . so long as it is understood that each is merely another ordering, another myth.

This takes the idea of freeplay of signifiers as a pretext for endless interpretative games, without the necessity to pay regard to standards of logic, or ideas of truth (Norris, 1990, p. 152; Eco, 1990, pp. 23-43; see also Bennington, 1989, p. 20 for other examples). As Norris (1990, pp. 138-139) argues, this approach denies all standards of interpretative consistency, resulting in "a kind of easy-going pluralist tolerance which leaves no room for significant disagreement on issues of principle or practice."

This position is hardly that of Derrida. While he has indefatigably pointed out the ways in which philosophy has rested its claims on reason, method, structure, and other concepts whose metaphorical nature it has not been able to acknowledge because of the risk to its own project in attempting to think beyond logocentrism he has always exposed this by working from within. He attempts to "solicit" this structure of concepts, to bring it down gently under its own weight, by demonstrating the paradoxes of difference and supplementarity which affect it, in the equally paradoxical necessity of using its own tools to subvert its express functions. As Derrida (1976, p. 158) argues, deconstruction

. . . is not easy and requires all the instruments of classical criticism. Without this recognition and this respect, critical production would risk developing in any direction at all and authorize itself to say almost anything.

There is no question of jettisoning, for example, the concept of intentionality. His exposure of the problematic factors in language demonstrates how what the text means to say differs from what it actually says, how intended meanings become caught up in signifying structures which are outside their control (Norris, 1990, p. 151). Where meaning is

. . . strictly undecidable in certain circumstances this cannot be taken to be synonymous with the claim that meaning is always and everywhere indeterminate (Norris, 1990, pp. 147-148).

There is no form of *a priori* concept or principle that would restrict the freeplay of meaning, the "play of oppositions," to those laid down by our received order of concepts and priorities through logocentrism *at the limit of language, in any final sense* (Norris, 1990, p. 152). Nevertheless, Derrida works with sustained care and meticulous attention to his texts at the highest analytical level, and any paradoxical positions he is able to expose are invariably hard won through the rigorous exercise of those tools which created the very positions which he overturns. Although this is not the place for an extended discussion of Derrida (Cooper, 1989; Linstead & Small, 1992), it is necessary to discuss two concepts which illustrate the distance between the "vulgar deconstruction" which characterizes much post-modern ethnography, and a deconstructive approach derived from a close reading of Derrida which might form the basis for a study of the textuality of social action.

OPPOSITIONAL AND SUPPLEMENTARY LOGICS

Central to Derrida's thought is the recognition that language always embodies a relationship of power between terms, one being used rather than another possible term in any text. That is to say, terms in language are used positively, effectively banishing those other terms from which they are differentiated. This is an oppositional *logic of identity*. Although positively-valued terms require an understanding of those negatively-valued terms in order to be meaningful (as "black" needs "white") they imply the absence of them. Accounts become persuasive by virtue of not presenting alternative formulations, and the act of re-presentation also becomes an act of repression of alternatives. Specifically, language is structured in terms of oppositions, each term depending on and being supported by the other in order to mean and although these terms interpenetrate each other they exist, or are treated as though they exist, in a hierarchy, a dualism, a relationship of power with one term at any moment dominant over the other.

Derrida (1976, pp. 27-73), as Cooper (1989) explains, is concerned to reconceptualize this oppositional either/or as a duality or cohabitation of terms: the division between them is not a partitioning of the un-alike but joining, a mutually supportive pivotal point around which meaning turns (Cooper, 1983). The one term needs the other, a supplementarity of both/and. Where modernism pursues the opposition of terms, actively placing the one over and against the other, post-modernism resists the closure of terms, actively exploring the supplementarity of the one within the other. It is this subtle relationship of structure/play (or process) rather than play banishing structure which is little appreciated in post-modern anthropology (Derrida, 1976, pp. 141-157; 1982, pp. 175-206; 1978, pp. 289-293).

There is no passing “beyond structuralism” except by a constant and vigilant awareness that the structuralist enterprise is deeply complicit with the whole pre-history of philosophic reason (Norris, 1985, pp. 222-223).

DECONSTRUCTION

Based upon this understanding of supplementary logic, deconstruction is the means by which Derrida operates on texts—and the world itself can be viewed as “text” (Cooper, 1989, p. 481; Eco, 1990, p. 23). Derrida indulges in little “literary criticism” in the conventional sense. Deconstruction is a means of revealing the contradictions inherent within texts, a means of exposing their logocentrism, their reliance on the metaphysics of presence, and of revealing their inescapable qualities of differance (Derrida, 1982, pp. 1-28) and supplementarity despite repressive textual strategies. Although deconstruction seeks to avoid the mystifications of other texts, it is nevertheless trapped within language and is bound to share some of the blindspots, and fall into some of the traps which it exposes in other writing. There is therefore no solid independent ground on which the deconstructionist can stand, and the method can and must be turned back on itself. In attempting to open up the closures of the texts he studies, entering into them and using their own terms against them, Derrida attempts to avoid merely setting up a meta-level of critical terms and thus becoming incorporated into the logocentrism he critiques. Cooper (1989, p. 483) refers to the two movements of deconstruction as *overturning* and *metaphorization*.

In the first movement, Derrida focuses on the binary oppositions of terms which we have already noted, existing in a hierarchy in which one term is suppressed. Of course, simply overturning the hierarchy at any moment, centering the marginal and marginalizing the central, remains an oppositional strategy, and itself creates another hierarchy which in turn requires overturning. Much so-called deconstructive criticism gets no further

than this. The second movement of metaphorization is necessary to keep the process in motion, to resist its degradation and ossification into structure. This entails the recognition that the positively-valued term at any moment is defined only by contrast to the negatively-valued term and that they interpenetrate and inhabit each other. In Derrida's writing this emerges as a ceaseless moving between terms, giving his work an elusive quality which is nevertheless an essential feature of his project (Derrida, 1982).

HOLISM AND FRAGMENTATION IN ETHNOGRAPHY

Post-modern anthropology sets itself specifically against holism, and the attempt to produce totalizing narratives. In this sense, it has some similarities with metaphorization. Yet the examples of "cultural critique" which Marcus & Fischer (1986, pp. 137-164) term "defamiliarization by epistemological critique" and "defamiliarization by cross-cultural critique" give several well-known examples of "overturning" which do employ more or less holistic approaches, or at least employ theory at more than a local level (Geertz, 1983; Pearce & Chen, 1989). Rosen (1985, 1988, 1990, 1991a,b) argues forcefully that a holistic approach enables ethnography to demystify as well as defamiliarize the taken for granted, in a style which powerfully and evocatively mixes genres. Linstead (1985a) uses Levi-Strauss' methodology for the analysis of myths to analyze everyday discourse on a factory floor, arguing that this both demystifies managerial formulations of "corporate culture" and delineates contours of resistance. He also (1985b) uses anthropological conceptualizations of the body in the analysis of industrial sabotage in the same setting, effectively to problematize the definition of the act itself. If fragmentation as a concept is to be at all useful in analysis, then it must be constantly brought to bear on conditions and structures of integration at textual, conceptual, and analytical levels while these integrating structures are simultaneously brought to bear on conditions of fragmentation (Burrell, 1990; Ulin, 1991). In this way we might begin to understand the passionate embrace of supplementarity in which structuralism and deconstruction are energetic bedfellows. If we are correct in assuming that thought is "nothing more and nothing less than a historically locatable set of practices" (Rabinow, 1986, p. 239) then the devices which connect thought and organized society must feel the focus of this attention.

THE PRAXIS OF A DECONSTRUCTIVE ETHNOGRAPHY

Traditional ethnography has developed a capacity for critique at an epistemological or social-institutional level by a comparison of the thought-

processes or social structures of other societies with its own. Where ethnography has developed “at home” into subsections of society, occupations, locations, or organizations, it has relied on a process of demystification through theorization, applying theory already developed or developing theory “grounded” in its ethnographic context. In either case, its critical leverage has depended on its ability to be taken for an accurate account of the social milieu in focus—to be taken as “fact.”

Post-modern ethnography asks of every representation “is this fact?” and refuses to come to any final conclusions (Birth, 1990, p. 555). It throws into question its own authority as an account, and whether it introduces the device of co-authorship or multiple voices or not, it nevertheless points to the possibility of an infinitude of interpretations and accounts. With no claim to factual superiority, how can it contest the accuracy of other accounts? How can it avoid the charge of nihilism if it recognizes no absolute authority and all facts, values, and assumptions are undecidable? How can it enable choice between accounts if all are substitutable and none have priority? How can it deal with non-epistemological issues (Morgan, 1983, p. 403; Jackson & Willmott, 1987, p. 364)—ideology, politics, ethics, morality—if its “relativization of the new” leaves it no means to challenge the “hegemony of the old?” (Webster, 1983, p. 202). In short, given its vulnerability to challenges from the perspective of political economy (Ulin, 1991, pp. 76-77), how can it contribute to praxis? (Jackson & Willmott, 1987).

These questions go further than those accusations of relativistic paralysis which assume that some form of absolute knowledge is a prerequisite for action. Empirical “objective” knowledge cannot be absolute: situated in history it is “circumscribed by a seriality it cannot transcend . . . possible only through material processes of production whose empiricity contradicts its ideal absoluteness” (Ryan, 1982, p. 213). Ethnography can neither be adequately defended nor attacked on this basis. However, acknowledging the falsity of metanarratives of truth does not inevitably lead to the post-modern pragmatism of Rorty or Lyotard, in which truth and power become more or less equated (Norris, 1985, p. 18; Ulin, 1991, p. 67; Margolis, 1989, pp. 25-28). Lyotard (1984) has particular relevance for organizational ethnography in that he sees the old patterns of centralization and control breaking down under post-modernity, as the influence of information technology fosters the growth and diffusion of information networks. As these networks become more densely interactive, the need for absolute legitimating truths will dwindle, and truth will be based on a consensus of whatever is held to hold true for a given society at a given stage in its cultural evolution. Linguistic practice (conformity to a language game) and performative power (its furtherance of the present

aims of knowledge) are the only truth criteria (Norris, 1985, p. 16). Ethnography in this scenario would provide detailed studies of fragmented information networks, clarifying linguistic practices and adding to the store of accessible data that would contribute to performativity and the development of the aims of knowledge. The fact that philosophy has debunked the objective truth is for Lyotard grounds for the optimistic assumption that with the spread of information and the “free circulation of ideas” (Norris, 1985, p. 16), knowledge and instrumental reason will collapse into each other and their attendant social and political structures will inevitably follow. Baudrillard (1988), less happy with this “naturalized relation between history, reason, and present-day consensus values” (Norris, 1985, p. 9), is profoundly disillusioned and pessimistic about the possibilities of transcending the simulated reality of the hyper-real disseminated by the new media. Ethnography in his scenario could do no more or less than record experience as the flickering of images on a television monitor, as his more recent writings do.

Morgan (1983) has extended Rorty’s (1979, 1982) concept of “reflective conversation” into the methodology of the social sciences. Based on interaction between researchers and research paradigms, traditions, and activities, its object is “mutual edification and self-awareness with regard to the conditions and consequences of research strategies” (Jackson & Wilmott, 1987, p. 365). Its advantages are proposed as the appreciation of a variety of voices in the conversation of research; the adoption of a tentative rather than absolute status for any truth claims; a detachment from normal presuppositions; and an increased awareness improving choice of research strategies or their modification. Jackson and Wilmott (1987, pp. 366-370) offer an extended critique of the flaws in this potentially attractive approach, which I will summarize. First, “reflective conversation” takes language as unproblematic, ironically ignoring the non-epistemological (ideological and other) influences which it evokes and symbolizes. As Derrida has demonstrated, language inevitably suppresses and privileges: as Jackson and Wilmott argue, it is not sufficient to acknowledge that this takes place but to examine what becomes privileged. The possibility that the sort of dialogue that “reflective conversation” proposes can take place is in considerable doubt because of the influences embodied in the language games of different scientific paradigms which may well be incommensurable (Jackson and Carter, 1991). Positivism, for example, limits its self-reflection to the authorial inspection for bias we have already noted.

Second, the process and possibility of “reflective conversation” depends on a value neutral logos which powers, or is powered by, a sort of altruistic goodwill among social scientists. This linguistic free market

there are no constraints on enquiry save conversational ones . . . only those retail constraints provided by the remarks of our fellow inquirers (Rorty, 1982, p. 165).

fails to connect with both the consequences and the sources of scientific motivation outside science, and their relation to practical interest and action in that arena, rather than the internal means–ends epistemological concerns of scientific communities. This form of “conversation” may be both a substitute for action, or distorted by the more powerful and loudest voices, as Morgan acknowledges. However, as Jackson and Wilmott argue, it is the near certainty that this will be the case that should be the center and starting point of consideration, rather than a marginal note.

Ethnography under “reflective conversation” would look very like “post-modern” ethnography, sharing as it does similar formative influences. Deconstructive ethnography, however, takes as its starting point not the frame “is this fact?” (Birth, 1990), but the consideration “how could this come to be considered as fact?” and “what are the consequences of treating this as fact?” Its grounding in philosophy is important, for as De Man (1984, p. 24, cited in Norris, 1985, p. 15) argues,

. . . philosophies that succumb to ideology lose their epistemological sense, where philosophies that try to bypass or repress ideology lose all critical thrust and risk being repossessed by what they foreclose.

This latter condition is ironically one of the consequences of pragmatism and a risk which is run by “reflective conversation.” Deconstructive ethnography gives attention to the historicity of epistemology (Rabinow, 1986, p. 241) as well as its textuality, and drives to demystify both traditional theoretical concepts, including those which it applies itself, and the workings of common-sense or naturalized perception (Norris, 1985, pp. 8-9). Insofar as it embraces holism, it is as

. . . the articulation of a diverse differentiated plurality: a unity or a whole or identity of a “totality” is never anything but that anyway. Once it is thought to be anything else, an absolute identity or totality for instance, authority must be wielded to make the material world correspond to the ideal form and make the technological construct of totality or identity seem natural (Ryan, 1982, p. 215).

Deconstructive ethnography then also works on the forms taken by this authority through its representations, linguistic, symbolic, and “textual” in its widest sense, to demystify them through revealing their own internal contradictions rather than the application of an external theoretical or moral standard.

CONCLUSIONS: ORGANIZATION AND DECONSTRUCTIVE ETHNOGRAPHY

The tension between organization and disorganization (Cooper, 1990), the drive to organize originating in the inherent “undecidability”

of terms in language and hence the nature of "truth" (Cooper, 1989; Linstead & Small, 1992), is discernible in all human structures. Derrida approaches this through "deconstruction," a procedure which works closely with the "texts" presented to use their own terms and contradictions within them first to overturn, then to "metaphorize" or keep them in motion, not allowing them to rest in a final meaning. Deconstructive ethnography approaches social and organizational life as a "text," entering in to its terms and using them to disrupt our conventionalized consciousness of their significance. In deconstructive ethnography, the use of theory is a device to resuscitate the subordinate terms, to elevate them, to amplify the silenced voices in order to problematize the dominant understanding and, rather than create a new hierarchy, to re-construct a duality of awareness within conventional consciousness. However, this device is not merely the pursuit of theoretical novelty for its own sake, and must arise from a close and relevant reading of the "text" in its own terms (Norris, 1990). It is in the rigor of the analysis which proceeds out from the text that the value of this analysis lies, rather than in its imaginative departure from the stimulus of the text into unlimited semiosis and unbounded interpretative pluralism or the semantic tyranny to which it subjects the text in order to "fix" it.

In the context of social action, "organized" both within and outside formal organizations, this deconstructive rigor will demystify in terms of the pursuit and identification of the sources and consequences of specific formulations and truth-effects, within the particular organizational, social, historical, and economic contexts in which they occur. It will also examine the specific paths which evocation takes in such contexts, exploring evocative fields alongside the consideration of the discursive fields within which conceptual and referential language forms knowledge-power relations (Foucault, 1970, 1972, 1977, 1980).

This will require of the ethnographer a self-reflexive capacity in order to recognize the processes of self-construction within accounts, and complement this with a self-deconstructive capacity. It will also require, in the process of evocatively "getting close to the earth" (Webster, 1983, p. 202) a poetic capability for self-negation and openness in the face of the other. Poetic rigor and conceptual rigor will ultimately combine in the production of the account, which will employ explicit literary and figurative devices poised in the space between "fact" and "fiction" where "truth" is manufactured. Articulating the tension between unity and dispersal, structure and play, will avoid closure but nevertheless identify some real limits to interpretation as this paradoxical precision teases out the critique which is always already implicitly present within all organized social/textual formulations.

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